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CAN URBAN SOLAR BECOME A "DISRUPTIVE"
TECHNOLOGY?: THE CASE FOR SOLAR UTILITIES
JOEL B. EISEN*
At the rate things are going, the sun is going to become a red giant and
engulf the inner planets before we ever get our solar panels. It took us
months to navigate the government and utility bureaucracies, we're
now waiting for the installers to work through their backlog, and
we're worried about the installation glitches that other solar bloggers
have reported. What I wouldn't have given for a power purchase
agreement (PPA), whereby an outside company navigates the bureau-
cracy and installs the panels for you, in return for collecting a share of
the public subsidies.1
- Scientific American writer George Musser, blogging on the
process of installing his solar system.
Residential solar has enormous potential for homeowners to gener-
ate electricity2 and address our formidable climate challenge. 3 Deploying
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks
Clayton LaForge and Susan Horn for research assistance, and W. Wade Berryhill, Chris
Brown, Ann Carlson, Lincoln Davies, Tamar Eisen, Bill Fisher, Leslie Forman, Jim Gib-
son, Alexis Madrigal, Michael Pisauro, Emmeline Paulette Reeves, Ron Rosenberg, Jim
Rossi, Noah Sachs and Steve Weiss for their helpful comments. Participants in the renew-
able energy symposia at the William & Mary Law School on January 29, 2010 and the
Washington and Lee School of Law on March 19, 2010 also contributed helpful com-
ments and information.
1. George Musser, Solar Power Purchase Agreements, aka Let Someone Else Deal with
the Paperwork for You, Solar at Home, Sci. AM., Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.scientific
american.com/blog/post.cfm?id=power-purchase-agreements-aka-let-s-2009-08-03.
2. One study has found that "27% of total residential rooftop area and 65% of
total commercial and industrial rooftops are suitable for converting sunlight into electric-
ity," and that rooftop solar could yield 712 gigawatts by 2015, or 27% of all U.S. electric-
ity needs. CTR. FOR ENERGY AND ENVrL. POL'Y, UNIV. OF DELAWARE, CREATING A
SOLAR CITY: DETERMINING THE POTENTIAL OF SOLAR ROOFTOP SYSTEMS IN THE CITY
OF NEWARK 7 (2009) [hereinafter CREATING A SOLAR CITY].
The potential for solar in new homes is also significant. See, e.g., GEORGE SIMONS,
CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, DEVELOPING COST-EFFECTIVE SOLAR RESouRcEs wiTH ELEc-
TRICITY SYSTEM BENEFITS (2005), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publica-
tions/CEC-500-2005-104/CEC-500-2005-104.PDF (observing that if each new home
slated to be built in California by the year 2017 "had a 2 kW solar installation, then the
total potential residential solar generation would be ... 4,886 MW").
3. See, e.g., Merrian C. Fuller et al., Toward a Low-Carbon Economy: Municipal
FinancingfJr Energy Efficiency and Solar Power, 51 ENV'T. MAG. 22, 24 (2009) (noting
that, "it may be virtually impossible to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the levels
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more renewables in existing and new homes4 can make such an impor-
tant contribution to reducing rising global temperatures that I will not
elaborate on it further here. 5 It also has considerable advantages over any
described by the lower-risk scenarios of the IPCC and adopted by local municipalities,
states, and nations without a targeted effort to reduce energy demand in existing homes
and commercial spaces," and that for this reason "retrofit efforts, such as improving
energy efficiency and adding solar photovoltaics (PV) and solar thermal systems to build-
ings, need to expand dramatically" (footnotes omitted)); Osha Gray Davidson, When it
Comes to Energy, Mark Jacobson Thinks Big, GRusT, Jan. 18, 2010, http://www.grist.org/
article/2010-01-17-when-it-comes-to-energy-mark-jacobson-thinks-big (interviewing
Mark Z. Jacobson, director of the Atmosphere/Energy Program at Stanford University)
("To complete the change to a sustainable energy society we'll need 3.8 million wind
turbines, 90,000 solar plants and many geothermal, tidal and rooftop photovoltaic instal-
lations around the world."). See generally ARjUN MAKHIJANI, CARBON-FREE AND
NUCLEAR-FREE: A RoADmAp FOR U.S. ENERGY POLICY (2007).
4. I use "homes" and "homeowners" throughout this Article with some caution.
Incentives to install solar technology are different in landlord-tenant and condominium
or cooperative building situations. UC BERKELEY SCHOOL OF LAw CTR. FOR LAw,
ENERGY & THE ENV'T. & UCLA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CTR., IN OUR BACKYARD:
How to Increase Renewable Energy Production on Big Buildings and Other Local Spaces
(2009), available at http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/Media%20Press/
White%20Paper.pdf [hereinafter IN OUR BACKYARD] ("Multifamily residential property
owners have little incentive to install renewable energy arrays that will lower energy costs
for their tenants but not for them, while tenants lack incentive to invest in renewable
energy technology for a rental property that they may vacate before they see a return on
the investment.").
Extending my model for deploying solar technology to multifamily properties would
pose considerable challenges that I do not mean to minimize. See Noah M. Sachs, Green-
ing Demand: Energy Consumption and U.S. Climate Policy, 19 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
F. 295, 307-08 (2009) (noting that "landlords usually choose the major appliances for
apartments and tenants usually pay the utility bills," and observing that "the impact of
this divergence is far from negligible"). This is but one of many issues that will require
further research. See infra Part V.B (discussing a research agenda). However, even if prop-
erly structured incentives only reached single-family homeowners, millions of Americans
would have solar panels installed. Professor Michael Vandenbergh notes that this type of
action would have enormous impact because "individual and household emissions make
up roughly 30 to 40 percent of U.S. C02 emissions." Michael P. Vandenbergh et al.,
Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1719
(2008) (citing the installation of solar PV panels as one of many actions to be taken).
5. There are contrary voices, of course. Some, such as economist Robert Michaels,
question a focus on renewables. See Robert J. Michaels, National Renewable Porfolio
Standard: Smart Policy or Misguided Gesture?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 79 (2008); Robert J.
Michaels, A Federal Renewable Electricity Requirement: What's Not to Like?, Cato Institute
Policy Analysis No. 627, Nov. 13, 2008, available at www.cato.orgpubs/pas/pa-627.pdf
But, as noted above, it is virtually "impossible" to address climate change without scaling
up renewable power.
Others propose cleaning up coal or turning to more nuclear power, but both of
those face considerable obstacles. See Victor B. Flatt, Paving the Legal Path for Carbon
Sequestration from Coal, 19 DUKE ENWvL. L. & POL'Y F. 211 (2009) (discussing carbon
capture and storage, a technology that, unlike solar, is still years off in the future). As for
nuclear power, as one observer notes, "[n]uclear energy has long been the drumbeat for
Republican lawmakers on how to reduce greenhouse gases," and, in response, President
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central power stations (powered by either renewables or conventional fos-
sil fuel). For example, it requires no new transmission capacity to accom-
modate it.6
Current initiatives promoting deployment of solar technology to
homeowners,7 however, are insufficient to motivate large numbers of
Obama recently proposed tripling the amount of loan guarantees available to the indus-
try. See Tom Doggett & Matt Speralnick, Obama Seeks to Boost Nuclear Power in New
Budget, REUTERS, Jan. 29, 2010 (quoting Josh Margolis of carbon brokerage firm
CantorCO2e). For the past several years, a handful of utility companies have begun work
on new nuclear power projects, but progress has been anything but smooth. See, e.g.,
David Biello, Nuclear Power Reborn, Sci. AM., Sept. 26, 2007. But see Katarzyna
Klimasinska, NRG Energy May Stop Texas Nuclear-Plant Expansion, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 29,
2010 (noting that San Antonio municipal utility CPS Energy may withdraw from the
project, jeopardizing its future).
6. This avoids a host of ongoing problems related to siting of new transmission
lines. Because renewable sources (particularly wind) tend to be located far from existing
transmission lines, new solar and wind farms require new transmission lines to reach
them. Sachs, supra note 4, at 304; Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a
Reality.-Finding Ways to Site Wind Power Facilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REv. 635, 651-53 (2008) (describing promising locations for wind power across the
nation and off shore).
Transmission siting has been a hot button issue of late, involving Not In My Backy-
ard ("NIMBY") attempts to resist new lines; an attempt in the Federal Power Act to give
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission "backstop" permitting authority where local
jurisdictions fail to act; a successful Fourth Circuit challenge to the FERC's rules on the
subject in Piedmont Environmental Council; and a Supreme Court denial of certiorari
that for now leaves the matter in the hands of the states, confusing the issue and possibly
blocking interstate transmission projects planned or in the works. See Saulius Mikalonis,
Energy Siting Decisions Likely to Remain Loca4 for Now, GREEN BLAWG, Jan. 28, 2010,
http://blog.mlive.com/green-blawg/20 10/01/energy-siting-decisions-likely.html. Dis-
tributed generation (generation at a home or other customer's premises) avoids this prob-
lem. See David Morris, Distributed Energy First, Wait On New Transmission Lines,
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, Apr. 28, 2008, http://www.renewableenergyworld.
com/rea/news/article/2008/04/dstributed-energy-first-wait-on-new-transmission-ines-
52252.
7. Homes are by no means the only place where solar can be scaled up. Excellent
recent studies discuss how more urban commercial buildings could go solar. See IN OUR
BACKYARD, supra note 4; TIMOTHY HASSEI-r & KARIN BORGERSON, WORLD
RESOURCES INST., HARNESSING NATURE'S POWER: DEPLOYING AND FINANCING ON-
SITE RENEWABLE ENERGY (2009), available at http://www.wri.org/publication/harnes-
sing-natures-power. The challenge of addressing climate change requires increasing
deployment of solar technology in both residential and commercial settings.
This is also not meant to slight the enormous promise of solar at the utility scale.
For example, in 2009, the company First Solar and the utility Southern California Edison
planned to build two large solar "farms," which would add 550 megawatts (MW) to the
grid in California. First Solar, SoCal Edison Set New Solar Projects, REUTERS, Aug. 18,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE57H3OH20090818. See also
Adam Browning, Let the Era of Solar Wholesale Distributed Generation Begin, GRIST, Jan.
21, 2010, http://www.grist.org/article/let-the-era-of-solar-wholesale-distributed-genera-
tion-begin (describing Southern California Edison's plans to buy solar power for 250
MW from independent solar developers at the scale of one to two MW, larger than
residential size systems). Google has invested in concentrated solar power to bring the
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consumers to adopt the technology. Renewables have gained little
ground in the past thirty years8 and the amount of residential solar gener-
ation can be measured in mere megawatts, 9 an infinitesimal fraction of
total residential electricity demand. Solar panels are more common in
some urban and suburban areas, but we are nowhere near having millions
of homes with photovoltaic (PV) panels, solar hot water heaters, and
solar shingles on their roofs.
Any incentives for increased deployment of urban solar must solve
four problems. The first has been widely recognized for decades: the high
upfront cost' ° of solar installations and long payback periods. The sec-
ond is the significant transaction costs associated with a solar installa-
tion-ranging from time spent evaluating technology alternatives to
finding the subsidies available and applying for them, in addition to
wrangling with local land use officials and monitoring what is effectively
a major home improvement project. Asking homeowners to become the
equivalent of general contractors deters all but the most determined from
installing solar panels. Without considerably revamping this process, it is
highly unlikely that residential solar will be anything other than a niche
market for years to come. If there is too much hassle associated with
cost down. Kit Eaton, Google Funds New Solar Power Tech, Plans to Cut Solar Thermal
Costs by a Quarter, FAST COMPANY, Sept. 10, 2009, http:// www.fastcompany.com/blog/
kit-eaton/technomix/google-yes-google-funds-new-solar-power-tech.
8. For over thirty years, the federal and state governments have promoted
increased use of renewable energy in the United States. This has not budged the needle
on the speedometer much. The percentage of electricity generated from non-hydropower
renewables (the ones with less controversial environmental impacts) has barely increased
since 1978, from a mere 2.5% to 4.5%. Richard Schmalensee, Renewable Electricity Gen-
eration in the United States, MIT CTR. FOR ENERGY AND ENVTL. POL'Y RES., Nov. 2009,
at 3, available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/233045791by-November-2009-Richard-
Schmalensee-Renewable-Electricity; see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF
ENERGY, 2008 ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 288 (June 2009), available at http://www.eia.
doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdf.
9. At the end of 2009, there were 1676 MW of PV installed in the U.S., and the
total installed solar capacity of 2108 MW made up less than 1% of the nation's total
electricity generation. Solar Energy Indus. Ass'n, About Solar Energy, http://www.seia.
org/cs/aboutsolar-energy/industry-data (last visited June 6, 2010).
California, the most solar state in the nation by far, has installed 140 MW of resi-
dential solar capacity through its California Solar Initiative as of June 2, 2010. California
Solar Initiative, California Solar Statistics, http://www.californiasolarstatistics.ca.gov/
reports/6-02-2010/Dashboard.html (last visited June 6, 2010). To put this number in
perspective, in 2008, there were 1445 coal-fired generating units in the U.S., with
337,300 MW of capacity. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EXISTING CAPACITY BY ENERGY
SOURCE 2008 (2010), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epatlp2.html (last
visited June 12, 2010).
10. See George Musser, Introducing 60-Second Solar: A Family Installs Panels on its
Roof Solar at Home, Sci. AM., Feb. 25, 2009, http:// www.scientificamerican.com/blog/
60-second-science/post.cfm?id=introducing-60-second-solar-a-famil-2009-02- 2 5.
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installing a solar panel, few will do it out of altruism or because they get a
few cents per kilowatt hour back on their electric bill each month.
The third problem relates to the solar industry's fragmented and
decentralized structure. Because most firms in it are still relatively small,
they do not capitalize on the potential economies of scale in deploying
residential solar widely. Most also do not have the comprehensive exper-
tise to address the wide variety of legal, financial, technical, and adminis-
trative tasks associated with solar installations in multiple states. This
makes it more difficult for widespread solar deployment to become a
reality. It increases transaction costs for homeowners who must deal with
several different entities during a solar installation and guess which ones
will be around in the long term when they need maintenance or other
support.
The fourth problem is a lack of incentives for any company to real-
ize the potential regulatory economies of scale. There are many moving
parts to the current regulatory environment for renewable energy sys-
tems. Any company that would offer a comprehensive solution for urban
solar must deal with state and federal utility regulators, local govern-
ments, and even private entities such as homeowners' associations. The
system is far too byzantine for one company that operates at current scale
to expend the upfront transaction costs of dealing with federal, state, and
local regulators in return for long-term predictability.
Regulatory uncertainty and instability have hampered companies
that are not large enough to weather a fickle regulatory climate. Some
incentives for solar power depend on financial support from governments
that have an inconsistent history of providing it. Tax incentives for
renewables tend to come and go with the political winds, and smaller
companies relying on them cannot survive when these incentives are
unavailable. Other incentives are constrained by state laws that vary
widely in their implementation. For example, a developer intending to
use renewable energy certificates (RECs) as a source of revenue may find
its plan stymied by state laws or judicial decisions that assign REC own-
ership inconsistently. Some new programs might exacerbate the problem
of regulatory complexity by requiring companies to deal with local gov-
ernments that are not prepared or willing to handle the additional
workload.
Existing and proposed governmental incentives for renewables do
not address these four challenges adequately. We need a bold idea, and I
argue that a new form of governmental assistance is required beyond
feed-in tariffs, tax credits and rebates, solar power purchase agreements,
and property tax financing."l There is a fundamental disconnect between
11. The DSIRE and Pew Center websites contain comprehensive descriptions of
state and federal incentives for renewables, breaking them down by state. Database of
State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa.org/ (last visited June
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these programs and incentives and how a technology gets in the hands of
ordinary people on a large scale. Revolutionary deployment of renewables
requires us to focus on what makes consumers likely to adopt a new
technology.12 The existing incentives are far smaller than those offered to
fossil fuel power producers, 13 but the bigger challenge is that they will
not lead us toward a rapid scaling up of solar technology deployment.
We require a completely new marketing and distribution solution to
achieve "disruptiveness" in solar technology. Harvard Business School
Professor Clayton Christensen developed this term to describe technolo-
gies that become so common that we wonder about the world before
they existed.' 4 Often a disruptive technology completely displaces an
existing one, providing an entirely new way of communicating or com-
puting (to take two examples), and making the previous technology
obsolete. Technological breakthroughs that reduce costs and increase
capabilities are important. Once upon a time, for example, cellular tele-
phones were as big as briefcases; 15 when they shrunk to palm size and
could be purchased for far less, it appeared that all of a sudden everyone
had one. However, technology alone is not sufficient to achieve disrup-
tiveness. It takes a number of factors, including governmental support of
some industries.
After examining the theory of disruptiveness and the inadequacy of
current initiatives for renewables, I argue for a disruptive solution to
solar. Achieving the kind of deployment that would be required to make
a serious down payment on our climate obligations will take something
far different than we have seen to date: companies devoted to national (or
6, 2010) [hereinafter DSIRE]; Pew Center on Global Climate Change, http://www.pew
climate.org (last visited June 6, 2010). Climate bills pending in Congress would provide
still more incentives. Section 102 of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
(ACES), for example, would empower states to establish rates to be paid by the utilities
they regulate, which would provide incentives for development of renewables. H.R. 2454,
111TH CONG. § 102 (2009).
12. Erwin Danneels, Disruptive Technology Reconsidered. A Critique and Research
Agenda, 21 J. Prod. Innov. Mgmt. 246, 255 (2004) (noting that "companies focusing on
future customers, rather than on current customers, had a greater degree of radical prod-
uct innovation").
13. Tyson Slocum, Director, Public Citizen's Energy Program, Slide Presentation:
Promoting Locally-Owned Renewable Electricity for Households: The Case for Feed-In
Tariffs 3 (Jan. 29, 2010), presented at Annual Symposium, Diversify Your Portfolio: Regu-
lating Energy Sources with Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards, WM. & MARY ENVTL.
L. & POL'y REV. (2010) (copy on file with author) (noting that "the oil industry [is]
receiving $9 billion/year in tax breaks + royalty relief").
14. Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching
the Wave, HARv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 43; see also CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN
& MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR'S SOLUTION (2003).
15. Mobile Planet, History of the Mobile Phones, http://mobile-planet.org/history
of mobiles.html (last visited June 6, 2010) (noting that First Generation cell phones
"were the size of a large briefcase and very inconvenient").
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at least regional), large-scale installations of solar technology, and which
are deeply capitalized and willing to take risks to bring solar to many
homeowners. I will term these "solar utilities," and I propose that one or
more of them should take over the entire process of solar marketing and
distribution in a wide geographic area.
Governmental policies must support and encourage developers to
offer a comprehensive solution to homeowners and help them overcome
the obstacles that currently hinder more widespread deployment of solar.
Specifically, I argue that protection from competition through the crea-
tion of regulated utilities is necessary to capitalize on both the economies
of scale of performing multiple installations, and the regulatory econo-
mies of scale. In the current landscape, there are numerous barriers to
this, and governmental intervention is required to overcome them.
Widespread deployment of urban solar requires that the upfront
cost for most (if not all) transactions be reduced to zero or something
close to it. In the structure I propose, a solar utility would provide the
solar panels to a homeowner and recoup the cost in three ways. One
would be a monthly charge to homeowners for the electricity provided,
as is done in the increasing number of "power purchase agreements"
("PPA") in the commercial setting. 6 I argue that homeowners would
view this more favorably than other current incentives. The developer
would also earn tax breaks for installing renewable energy systems, and
would take in revenue from the sale of RECs generated by projects,
assuming the ongoing legal issue regarding their ownership is addressed.
Some assert that existing utilities have incentives to take on this task
because building power plants is becoming increasingly costly and renew-
able resources can be deployed more quickly. 17 Climate change regula-
tion might even lead to the elimination of one traditional generation
option: coal-fired power plants. 8 A network of small solar generators,
connected to the utility's grid, might someday provide enough capacity
to allow a utility to forego construction of a new power plant.' 9 One
16. See infra Part IV.D.
17. See, e.g., SUNPOWER CORP., THE DRIVERS OF THE LEVELIZED COST OF
ELECTRICITY FOR UTILITY-SCALE PHOTOVOLTACs 2 (2008) ("All PV can be con-
structed quickly and even utility-scale power plants can begin delivering power within a
few quarters of contract signing-a major advantage when compared to conventional
power plants.").
18. New rules regulating GHG emissions might spur development of non-pollut-
ing options if companies are unwilling to bear the costs involved in complying with them.
See, e.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70 and
71) (EPA proposal to regulate GHG emissions at major facilities).
19. The "Million Solar Roofs" program, part of the California Solar Initiative, has
a goal of 3,000 MW of rooftop solar by 2020. Press Release, Office of the Governor,
Schwarzenegger Signs Legislation to Complete Million Solar Roofs Plan (Aug. 21, 2006),
available at http://gov.ca.govlindex.php?lpress-release/3588. This is equal to the output
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might expect utilities to embrace this idea, but to date they largely have
not.2" Appealing to them to change their ways is a low-value proposition
at best, and we need to bypass electric utilities to make urban solar hap-
pen. 2' This may be difficult to see today, just as it would have been hard
to foresee the rise of the personal computer industry in 1965.
Establishing new solar utilities and an accompanying regulatory
structure for deploying solar widely cannot be done without addressing a
number of issues. I describe several of these in a "research agenda,"2 2 and
I conclude that even though they require further study, this new struc-
ture is the most promising way that solar could change electricity genera-
tion as profoundly as the Internet, digital photography and cell phones
changed existing industries.
II. URBAN SOLAR AS A DISRUPTIvE TECHNOLOGY
There are signs that solar is at a tipping point. One commentator
compares it to "watching the Internet mature in 1995. "23 Technological
breakthroughs in solar PV media have created higher efficiencies in con-
verting sunlight into electricity, and brought the cost of panels down
substantially.24 Design changes have blunted objections that solar tech-
nology is unsightly.2 5 This is not a technology that exists only in the
minds of dreamers in lab coats. It is here today and ready to go. The
technology will continue to improve, but right now homeowners can
simply go down to a home improvement store and purchase off-the-rack
of several large conventional power stations. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FoRM EIA-860
DATABASE ANNUAL ELECTRIC GENERATOR REPORT, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaflelec-
tricity/page/eia860.html (follow "Download: 2007: ZIP" hyperlink; open "PlantY07.xls"
file) (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (492 coal-fired power plants in the U.S., with an average
size of 667 MW).
Utility-scale installations also hold potential for replacing conventional power plants.
See MAKHIjANi, supra note 3, at 43 (discussing potential for hypothetical 1,000 MW
plant in the Southwest); SUNPOWER CoI'., supra note 17, at 2 (discussing a proposed
250 MW solar central power station for California's Central Valley).
20. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
21. Moreover, the experiment with electric utility restructuring in the past two
decades has largely been a failure, and a number of states have reverted to strengthening
incumbent utilities' dominant positions. They do not seem amenable to new competi-
tion, and rewarding them for their incumbent status is not a good idea.
22. Infra Part V.B.
23. George Musser, Prospects fir solar: "It's like watching the Internet mature in
1995", Solar at Home, Sci. AM., Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.scientificamerican.com/
blog/post.cfm?id=prospects-for-solar-its-like-watchi-2009-10-29.
24. MAKHIJANI, supra note 3, at 37-40.
25. Solar Power, Solar Panels-Power For Homes, Apr. 3, 2009, http://solarpower
homes.biz/solar-panels-power-for-homes ("The designs of solar panels today are not ugly
to look at. In fact, solar panels can now blend with your home's existing design") (last
visited June 6, 2010).
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systems. u6 That technology could be scaled up and widely deployed, u7
and China, where a large and growing percentage of the population has
solar hot water heaters, has shown us this is possible.2u
The barrier to bringing solar to the masses is getting consumers to
adopt it, not a lack of technological maturity. The federal or state gov-
ernments could possibly overcome this barrier by simply mandating more
solar installations. State renewable portfolio standards (RPS) require
many utilities to generate a specified percentage of their electricity from
renewable sources or purchase credits to make up the difference, 29 and
some pending climate bills would extend these mandates to the entire
nation.3" Utilities could achieve these targets in large part by installing
solar panels on their customers' roofs.3 1 However, RPSs have had more
26. See infra note 202 and accompanying text regarding the Home Depot installa-
tion service.
27. Davidson, supra note 3 (quoting Mark Jacobson's statement that, "we have
proven, up-and-running technologies right now that could do the job").
28. Joel B. Eisen, China s Renewable Energy Law: The "Green" To China " "Black,"
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. (forthcoming 2010) (on file with author) [here-
inafter Eisen, China ' Renewable Energy Law] (noting that one in ten Chinese households
have solar hot water heaters). On his blog, Green Leap Forward, author Julian L. Wong, a
noted energy analyst at the Center for American Progress, describes numerous steps that
China is taking to promote solar. Julian L. Wong, Solar Hops: US-China Cooperation;
Provinces Get Going, Suntech Shining Strong, GREEN LEAP FORWARD, http://greenleap
forward.com/2010/01/21 /solar-hops-us-china-cooperation-provinces-get-going-suntech-
shining-strong (last visited June 6, 2010).
29. As of 2009, twenty-eight states have RPS mandates and an additional five have
voluntary goals or other RPS-like programs. Approximately 50% of total electricity load
is now in states that have RPS programs. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Renewable Portfolio
Standards Fact Sheet, http://www.epa.gov/chp/state-policylrenewables.html (last visited
June 6, 2010). See generally K.S. CORY & B.G. SwEzEv, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STAN-
DARDS IN THE STATES: BALANCING GOALS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES, NAT'L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB (2007).
30. Section 101 of ACES, for example, would establish a "Combined Efficiency
and Renewable Electricity Standard," amending the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
(PURPA) to require retail electric suppliers selling more than four million megawatt
hours (MWh) of electricity to meet a combined renewable electricity, energy efficiency,
and conservation target of 20% in 2020. H.R_ 2454, 11 1th Cong. § 101 (2009); see also
U.S. House of Rep., Comm. on Energy and Com., The American Clean Energy and
Security Act (H.I 2454), June 1, 2009, available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id= 1633&catid- 1 55 &Itemid= 55 (last
visited June 12, 2010) (offering a brief executive summary of the bill).
31. The largest proposed projects are in California and the Southwest. See, e.g.,
Martin LaMonica, Utiliy PG&E to Finance Rooftop Solar Panels, CNET.coM, Jan. 20,
2010, http://news.cnet.com/8301-11128_3-10437876-54.html (proposed project by
utility PG&E, which is subject to California's aggressive RPS, to "install more than 1,000
solar power systems for U.S. homeowners and businesses").
One Eastern utility pursuing a residential distributed generation program is Duke
Energy. See In the Matter of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. E-7, 2008 N.C. PUC
LEXIS 2244 (Dec. 31, 2008) (conditionally granting approval of a solar photovoltaic
distributed generation program and a proposed method for recovering associated costs,
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effect in prompting development of large-scale renewable energy facili-
ties. 32 As Professor Jim Rossi points out, "past efforts to use legal reforms,
and especially mandates, to induce technological change have produced
mixed results," and "a national RPS mandate is unlikely to be the silver
bullet that slays all of the barriers to renewable power development."
33
However, as I discuss below, a RPS can be a useful part of the policy
foundation for solar utilities.
What would be the best approach for widespread solar deployment?
One answer may come from scholarship that focuses on technologies that
dramatically alter the competitive landscape. These disruptive technolo-
gies "change the bases of competition because they introduce a dimen-
sion of performance along which products did not compete
previously. " The technologies "initially underperform existing ones,"
but then, over time, catch up and displace them.35 Disruptiveness con-
notes speed and an abrupt dislocation of an industry's trajectory: once
the new innovation catches on, it rapidly displaces existing technology.36
Incumbent firms tend to miss opportunities to innovate, and thus dis-
ruptive technologies "tend be associated with the replacement of incum-
bents by entrants."
37
There are grey areas in disruptiveness theory. One is whether a tech-
nology is inherently disruptive, or whether we measure disruptiveness
after the fact by seeing how it revolutionized the competitive environ-
ment.31 It can be tough to answer this because many case studies are
retrospective views after disruption has taken place. For this reason, the
theory may be better at explaining how certain innovations succeeded (or
and describing the twenty MW program, up to ten percent of which will involve small-
scale facilities on rooftops). As a utility doing business in North Carolina, Duke Energy is
subject to that state's RPS, which this program is intended to help meet. Id at *5.
32. Slocum, supra note 13, at 5. The extent to which an RPS encourages new
generation is a subject of considerable debate, with one study concluding that the
national RPS proposed in climate legislation "would have 'effectively zero' impact on
renewable energy generation." Id.
33. Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (quoting Gary E. Merchant, Sustainable Energy
Technologies: Ten Lessons from the History of Technology Regulations, 18 WIDENER L.J. 831,
834 (2009) ("Notwithstanding the many available legal options for attempting to induce
technology change in energy supply and demand, forcing beneficial technology change is
a difficult endeavor.")). See also Slocum, supra note 13, at 9 (an RPS is no guarantee that
new renewable generation capacity will be built).
34. Danneels, supra note 12, at 249.
35. Id.
36. See generally LARRY DowNEs & CHUNKA MUI, UNLEASHING THE KILLER
APP: DIGITAL STRATEGIES FOR MARKET DOMINANCE (1998). This can make it difficult
to decide when a particular technology has become disruptive. Danneels, supra note 12,
at 249.
37. Danneels, supra note 12, at 249.
38. Id. at 247.
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did not, as the case may be) than at predicting which ones will succeed.3 9
On the other hand, explaining why companies in existing industries fail
to recognize new technologies' potentials4" can help us describe how
technologies may succeed, and even a retrospective look can tell us much
about the preconditions for success.
Professor Christensen focuses on incumbent companies' organiza-
tional resources, processes, and values. Applying disruptiveness principles
to a different public policy problem (health care), he explains that,
"[d] isruptions are rarely plug-compatible with the prior value network, or
commercial ecosystem." 4 Existing companies are often incapable of
departing from existing business models.4 2 New technologies require
incumbent companies to downplay or even jettison existing businesses,
and their business structures may not allow for the nimbleness it takes to
enter a new market.4 3 "Not one of the minicomputer companies," Chris-
tensen observes, "succeeded in the personal computer business."
44
Incumbent companies ignore disruptive innovations because existing
technologies look more profitable than innovative products.4 5 Many
innovations find smaller markets at first than one would expect at the
relatively mature state of their development. In other words, disruptive
technologies are often well-developed before disruption happens, and
require companies with the foresight to capitalize on their potential.
39. Id. at 250 (citing Don S. Doering & Roch Parayre, Identification and Assess-
ment of Emerging Technologies, in WHARTON ON MANAGING EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
75 (George S. Day, Paul J. H. Schoemaker, & Robert E. Gunther eds., 2000) ("Signifi-
cant emerging technologies are easily seen after the fact, and companies are then congrat-
ulated or castigated for their decisions to pursue them or ignore them. But rarely are the
winners clear at the outset.")). Professor Danneels points to this as another way in which
disruptiveness theory needs further testing. Id. ("Even though Christensen never claims
that all (potentially) disruptive technologies succeed, his exclusive selection of those that
did presents an analytical problem.").
40. Id. at 251 (noting that "much prior research has found that innovations that
ultimately transform an industry often do not originate from the industry's leaders").
41. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., THE INNOVATOR'S PRESCRIPTION: A
DIsRuPTIvE SOLUTION FOR HALTH CARE xxviii (2009).
42. Clayton M. Christensen & Michael Overdorf, Meeting the Challenge of Disrup-
tive Change, HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 68 ("[W]hen a new venture captures
their imagination, they [companies] get their people working on it within organizational
structures . . .designed to surmount old challenges-not ones that the new venture is
facing.").
43. For example, managers may be expected to keep up historical growth rates of
sales and may balk at new products that entail risks. Id. at 73.
44. Id. at 72.
45. Id. at 73. See also Clayton Christensen, Key Concepts-Disruptive Innova-
tion, http://www.claytonchristensen.com/disruptive-innovation.html (last visited June 6,
2010) ("Characteristics of disruptive businesses, at least in their initial stages, can include:
lower gross margins, smaller target markets, and simpler products and services that may
not appear as attractive as existing solutions when compared against traditional perform-
ance metrics.").
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Electric utilities have an entrenched monopoly position delivering
electricity to consumers, which makes them obvious candidates to scale
up solar. Yet as incumbent companies, most of them have not warmed to
this task.46 Utilities often view renewables as too intermittent to ensure
that the lights never go out.4 7 Under existing business models, distrib-
uted generation does not appear as lucrative as building and operating
central power stations. In my home state, Dominion Virginia Power
makes huge profits by selling power generated from coal, nuclear, and
natural gas plants.48 It has a new coal-fired power plant coming soon,4 9
and no plans to deploy residential solar panels.
50
The electric utility industry's regulatory environment promotes
technological stagnation, 51 and utilities also lack "marketing compe-
tence." They do not have "the skills to conduct research on a new mar-
ket, to set up a new distribution and sales channel, to build a reputation
46. Slocum, supra note 13, at 13 (noting that "the last thing an investor-owned
utility wants to do is turn its customers into independent power producers"); Sachs, supra
note 4, at 310 ("The rate structures of electric and natural gas utilities serve as yet another
barrier to the adoption of energy-efficient products and practices.").
47. See, e.g., Statement of James Y. Kerr, II, Counsel, Electric Reliability Coordi-
nating Council, before the U.S. House of Rep., Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Sub-
comm. on Energy and Air Quality (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://energycommerce.
house.gov/Press_111/20090423/testimony-kerr.pdf. Kerr, the former president of the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, argued that "[u]nlike natural
gas or coal, which can be extracted and stored or transported for later use, renewable
power is highly variable and must be backed up." Id.
48. Peter Bacque, SCC staff. Cut Electric Rates of Va. Power, RICHMOND TIMEs-
DISPATCH, Dec. 10, 2009 (noting that utility earned a 17.26% rate of return on average
equity in 2008).
49. Dominion's new 585-MW coal-fired power plant, under construction and
scheduled to be completed in mid-2012 in Wise County in southwest Virginia, has
attracted considerable controversy. In 2004, Virginia ended its experiment with electric
utility restructuring with a re-regulation law that included a rate adder for the Wise plant.
In 2007, Virginia Power applied to the Virginia State Corporation Commission for
approval of the plant and the rate increase, sparking a number of legal challenges. See
Chris Graham, Environmental Groups Challenge Wise County Coal Plant, AUGUSTA FREE
PRESS, Sept. 30, 2009; Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm'n, 675 S.E.2d 458 (Va.
2009); Appalachian Voices v. State Air Pollution Ctrl. Bd., No. 2199-09-2, 2010 WL
2035119 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
50. Mark Webb, Dominion: New Directions in Energy, in Annual Symposium,
Diversify Your Portfolio: Regulating Energy Sources with Renewable Energy Portfolio
Standards, WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'y REv. (Jan. 29, 2010) (copy on file with
author) (listing Dominion's plans for expansion of generation, none of which involve
residential installations). In his symposium presentation, Webb, Director of Policy and
Business Evaluation for Dominion's Alternative Energy Solutions unit, termed residential
generation an option for the unspecified future.
51. An excellent example of this is the ongoing debate in a number of states over
whether developers implementing power purchase agreements should be defined as public
utilities under state law, where incumbent utilities have used existing laws to argue in
favor of protecting their incumbency. See injra Part IV.D.
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in a different market, and so forth."52 They are accustomed to generating
power at central power stations or purchasing it from other generators,
not installing home solar systems. To install home solar systems would
require thousands of installations at residential and commercial sites, all
posing unique site characteristics. Utilities are like homebuilders that
reproduce the same boxes repeatedly rather than custom build homes.
Rapid scaling up of solar would therefore take disruptive innovation
in the business model of the entity accomplishing it. New entrants in
industries often have fundamentally different resources and competences
than companies burdened with incumbency's disadvantages. They have
different technologies and simpler, better ways of doing things that are
"tailored to the nature of competition in these disruptive markets."53
This is a familiar explanation for the rise of startup companies that
became household names-the Microsofts, Oracles, Googles, and so
forth. 54 As we will see, there is no entity like this at present for urban
solar, and, without one, solar is forever likely to be a niche product.
III. How TECHNOLOGY DISRUPTS, AND WHY SOLAR
TECHNOLOGY HASN'T
What would this entity be? First, we should ask what factors lead to
disruptiveness. As one would expect, the answer is different for different
industries, but there are some constants. What appears to be happening
instantaneously requires a number of elements to fall in place over a
period of years. 55 One of those crucial factors, in many cases, is govern-
mental support.
A. Government Support Is Often Essential
Disruptiveness often depends on a long string of evolutionary and
revolutionary discoveries, and on crucial support from federal and state
governments. 56 Direct government support to industries to encourage
52. Danneels, supra note 12, at 254.
53. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 8.
54. To take one of many examples, consider how Google revolutionized the task of
searching the Internet by ranking pages depending on the links pointing back at a specific
site. See History of Search Engines: From 1945 to Google 2007, http://www.searchengine
history.com/#google (last visited June 6, 2010).
55. Danneels, supra note 12, at 254. This leads some to criticize disruptiveness
theory as simplistic. See John C. Dvorak, The Myth of Disruptive Technology,
PCMAG.COM, Aug. 17, 2004, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2 8 17,1628049,00.asp
("When there is true disruption, it comes from inventions, regulatory and social change,
complementary technologies, coincidence, and demand.") (emphasis added).
56. See, e.g., Al Gore, Vice President of the United States, Speech at the University
of Pennsylvania, The Technology Challenge: How Can America Spark Private Innova-
tion? (Feb. 14, 1996) available at http://ftp.arl.army.mil/-mike/comphist/96gore/index.
html (noting for several different consumer devices that "the federal government provided
the initial spark that eventually flickered into these extraordinary products").
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their growth is not new, as it dates to Hamilton's Report on
Manufactures.57
To illustrate this, let's start with a technology that has become com-
monplace: the cell phone. Millions of consumers now carry devices with
them that can do what the most sophisticated computers taking up large
rooms would have done in the 1950s. 58 The diffusion of computing
power to the fingertips of American eleven-year-olds is a remarkable
achievement, but not too long ago the prospect of it seemed futuristic.
What changed? Technology (really, many discrete technologies)
advanced, but we should also credit the development of a national net-
work on which to use the phones. The story of this development is well
known and spans several decades, beginning with the federal govern-
ment's assignment of bands on the cell phone spectrum and licenses to
telecommunications companies, and continuing with the construction of
networking towers and ancillary infrastructure, and the establishment of
national cellular telephone networks.
59
This development would not have happened without governmental
involvement in selecting the companies that subsequently delivered ser-
vice to large numbers of end users. Some entrants were start-ups that
arose to compete with existing telephone companies, but others were the
telephone companies themselves, benefitting from regulatory decisions
that assigned geographic territories to existing wire line companies along-
side new cellular ones. 60 The development of a national cellular phone
network did not in and of itself put cell phones in the hands of millions,
but it was vital to the industry's success.
57. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES (1791).
58. See, e.g., Clayton Christensen et al., The Great Disruption, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 2001, 80, 83-85 (discussing the evolution of computers from the ENIAC
room-size computer of 1946 to the present and noting that personal computers "today do
tasks far more complex than those that mainframes and mini computers used to solve").
59. See In re Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Litig., 385 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (2005)
("Wireless telephone service was first introduced in the U.S. in the early 1980s. At that
time, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") allocated spectrum such that
only two companies could provide service in any given market. Beginning in 1995, how-
ever, the FCC auctioned new spectrum for PCS, which ultimately consisted of more than
twice the amount of spectrum previously allocated to wireless telephone service. The
allocation of PCS spectrum enabled as many as eight competitors to operate within a
single market ... The mid-1990s increase in the amount of spectrum allocated paralleled
and enabled another significant change in the wireless industry: the switch from analog to
digital technology."). See also Jeremy T. Fox, Consolidation in the Wireless Phone Industry
(NET Inst., Working Paper No. 05-13, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.comisol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=850445.
60. Until the late 1980s, the FCC licensed two cellular carriers in each metropoli-
tan area, an "A Block" (non-wire line) and "B Block" (wire line) carrier. See United States
Federal Communication Commission, Data Band Plan, http://wireless.fcc.gov/services/
index.htm?job--service bandplan&id=cellular (last visited June 6, 2010).
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Going back to the early days of our nation and Charles River
Bridge,6 1 we have understood that some endeavors are so large that they
require early intervention by the federal and state governments. These are
opportunities that deter all initial entrants except the government or a
company that stands in its shoes by virtue of a regulator's blessing (for
example, a public utility's certificate of convenience and necessity). But
they are also compelling enough that initial entrants are willing to capi-
talize on their first-mover advantages and run the risk that their success
attracts other competitors, and, eventually, full blown un-tethering from
government support.6 2
These endeavors have often centered on construction of infrastruc-
ture on a large scale (telecommunications networks, for example). The
Internet was the product of direct governmental involvement.6 3 The situ-
ation with respect to urban solar is different because companies are not
required to build a massive physical network. The electricity grid already
exists, although President Obama and others have pushed for "smart
grid" initiatives to modernize it.64 The purpose of the network is also
different. A cell phone user wants assurances that she will be able to use
her phone no matter where she travels; a solar panel owner uses her panel
at her residence. However, this distinction may not matter. To bring solar
to American households, I will conclude that, much as we did with cable
television and cellular phones, we need to think both bigger and better-
with the government's help-than we do now about marketing and dis-
tributing the technology.
B. The Centrality of the Consumer Experience
People may be interested in buying solar panels one day, but are not
yet able to or may not even know where to go to buy the panels.65
61. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837).
62. Id. As one commentator notes, the case is a touchstone of our "legal attitude
toward technological change" because it stands for the proposition that courts will not
allow "vested rights to block technological progress" when that progress is in the public
interest. Peter Linzer, From the Gutenberg Bible to Net Neutrality-How Technology Makes
Law and Why English Majors Need to Understand It, 39 McGEORGE L. REV. 1, 14-18
(2008).
63. JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, THE RELENTLESS REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF
CAPITALISM 345 (2010).
64. Grant Gross, Obama Includes Broadband, Smart Grid in Stimulus Package,
ITWORLD, Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.itworld.com/government/60362/obama-includes-
broadband-smart-grid-stimulus-package; BRACKEN HENDRICKS, CTR. FOR Am. PRO-
GRESS, WIRED FOR PROGRESS: BUILDING A NATIONAL CLEAN-ENERGY SMART GRID
(2009). Section 1301 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 contains
provisions designed to spur smart grid development. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, SMART
GRID STATUS REPORT (2009).
65. Jen Lynch, 10 Things Every Company Should Know: Why RE Needs PR in 2010,
RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD, Jan. 5, 2010, http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/
blog/post/20 10/01/top- 10-for-20 10-why-re-needs-pr.
68 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24
A new technology is disruptive both to the industry it displaces and
to consumers who purchase it. One difficult element of disruptiveness is
assessing the role of consumer demand in the process. Forecasting con-
sumer demand for a new product is one of the most difficult enterprises
in American business. When we look at the competitive landscape after a
product has gained widespread acceptance, it is often nearly impossible to
tell what factors led to its success.66 Does a technology become disruptive
when a critical mass of new customers demands it and the market
responds? Or can proper product development and marketing by a savvy
company stimulate latent demand? Often, we are not quite sure.
Our ex post evidence can yield some clues. Because market share
increases rapidly at some point, a form of contagion appears to take over
when enough consumers have the technology (such as the latest
smartphone) that others demand to have it as well. This enthusiasm for a
new product can accelerate demand, bringing the technology to more
consumers more quickly than anyone had thought possible beforehand.
6 7
Is there a real possibility that this would happen with solar-that
thousands or even millions of consumers would demand the solar panels
they saw going up on their neighbors' roofs? As I discuss in this section,
there is little likelihood of this in today's decentralized system of
deploying panels. This in and of itself is an important reason to change
the business model by which solar is installed. Until systems go up in
large numbers in proximity to one another, it is unrealistic to expect
strong consumer demand.68
66. Beyond the work of Professor Christensen and others, there is an enormous
body of literature on the lag between introduction of a product and its general accept-
ance. Economist H. Peyton Young's work on innovation diffusion focuses on the role of
three different models: contagion, social influence, and social learning, which are defined
as:
1. Contagion. People adopt when they come in contact with others who have
already adopted; that is, innovations spread much like epidemics.
2. Social influence. People adopt when enough other people in the group have
adopted; that is, innovations spread by a conformity motive.
3. Social learning. People adopt once they see enough empirical evidence to con-
vince them that the innovation is worth adopting, where the evidence is gener-
ated by the outcomes among prior adopters. Individuals may adopt at different
times due to differences in their prior beliefs, amount of information gathered,
and idiosyncratic costs.
H. Peyton Young, Innovation Diffiusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social
Influence, and Social Learning, 99 Am. ECON. REv. 1899, 1900 (2009). Young uses a
classic study of Midwestern farmers' adoption of hybrid corn in the 1930s to illustrate the
difficulties of attributing the speed of adoption to any one factor. Id.
67. Young describes this as "contagion." Id.
68. This assumes that homeowners might be enthusiastic about installing solar
panels under the terms of the model I propose in this Article. Needless to say, we have no
evidence to support this proposition, and some careful market research would be neces-
sary to support it. See infra Part V.B (discussing agenda for further research).
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Moving the focus to the beginning of the product deployment
cycle, one question is what differentiates companies that succeed in sell-
ing disruptive products from those that fail. Already, we have seen that
these companies are structured differently from incumbent companies. 69
This focus in the literature on how companies miss out on new technolo-
gies can make it seem that consumers' needs are not important.7 0 How-
ever, scholars conclude that focusing on these companies inevitably
highlights their myopic failures to understand "the latent and unex-
pressed needs of [their] customers."7 1
We should resist any notion that dynamic companies respond to
consumer preferences that are well articulated from the outset. When the
"performance levels offered by a disruptive technology meet or exceed the
minimum levels demanded by the mainstream market," 72 that technol-
ogy is poised to succeed. Yet that statement is a bit circular: we know that
consumers demand certain features of disruptive technologies, but how,
and when? If, by definition, a consumer does not know a disruptive tech-
nology exists, she cannot demand it. So it must be the case that certain
product characteristics are known ahead of time but others (speed,
processing rates, and so on) that consumers could not have easily foreseen
take on importance during the time period when the product is gaining
acceptance.
1. Disruptiveness Relates to the New Technology's Promise
This insight that products satisfy latent demand is at the core of
disruptiveness theory. Defining consumers' objectives in conventional
terms (that is, by existing products' performance metrics) makes new
technology look unpromising. Consider solar technology. If the goal is
defined as generating power as cheaply and easily as possible, solar is not
yet there. A solar panel does not replicate the existing electricity delivery
system. Solar does not guarantee that lights will come on and computers
will keep running. The sun has to shine, which is not always assured in
many locations,7 3 and the intermittent nature of solar power generation
makes it difficult in many areas to rely on it to meet households' entire
69. See generally Christensen & Overdorf, supra note 42 (offering cautionary tales
of businesses that failed to adapt and making suggestions for restructuring companies to
take advantage of innovations).
70. Danneels, supra note 12, at 255.
71. Id. (noting that these companies pursue "a very reactive, narrow notion of
customer orientation").
72. Id. at 249.
73. MAKIIJANI, supra note 3, at 46 ("The average over 24 hours is, of course,
considerably lower due to a variety of factors, mainly no sunshine at night, considerably
reduced insolation in the early morning and late afternoon hours, cloud cover, seasonal
variations, and precipitation. As a result, the average annual insolation across most of the
contiguous United States and Hawaii ranges from about four to about eight kilowatt
hours per day per square meter.").
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electricity demands. In some parts of the nation, electricity generated
from solar panels is nearly cost-competitive with that purchased on the
wholesale market, 74 but it still costs more. Solar systems might require
maintenance, unlike conventional electricity, which can be had at the flip
of a switch.
Yet all of this is exactly what can make it disruptive. A new technol-
ogy is often not superior to existing technologies. 7 5 New technologies
perform differently, 76 and may not offer all of the functions of existing
ones. For example, Internet telephone services such as Skype lack access
to 911 emergency dialing.7 7 A disruptive technology does not succeed
because it does the existing task well (it doesn't), but because it offers a
simpler, more affordable, and different way of achieving goals that con-
sumers did not previously know were achievable.
Solar's disruptive potential is to satisfy an entirely different set of
goals. It produces cheaper power if environmental externalities are
accounted for. A number of utilities have "green pricing" programs to
provide consumers power today at a small premium to internalize those
externalities.78 The limited reach of these programs shows that arguing
on altruism alone is not sufficient to attract most consumers. 7 9 However,
solar can have other attributes. It can be more resilient and reliable
because it does not rely on a complex system of generation, transmission,
and distribution to bring power to the house. The system can be simple
enough that maintenance could be done with hand tools. The potential
for terrorists to take out generating capacity would be virtually nonexis-
tent. Finally, although solar is more expensive today, the cost of power
74. Id. at 38 (quoting a U.S. Department of Energy study that technology break-
throughs will "put the U.S. industry on track to reduce the cost of electricity produced by
PV from current levels of $0.18-$0.23 per kWh to $0.05-$0.10 per kWh by 2015-a
price that is competitive in markets nationwide"). On a "levelized cost" basis, with the
cost of new transmission capacity factored in, solar is currently on par with fossil fuel
options. Slocum, supra note 13, at 4.
75. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 5.
76. Danneels, supra note 12, at 249.
77. Steven I. Oster, Internet Telephone Services for Individuals and Small Businesses,
J. ACCoUNTANCY, May 2009, available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/
2009/May/2008843.htm.
78. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, GREEN PRICING: UTILITY PROGRAMS BY STATE,
http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/pricing.shtml?page=l (last visited June
6, 2010) for a comprehensive list of these programs.
79. News Release, Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., NREL Highlights Utility Green
Power Leaders (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/news/press/2009/679.
html (noting that, "600,000 customers are participating in utility programs nationwide,"
with the largest program accounting for an average of 82 MW). The NREL finds this an
encouraging number but it is still a very small share of overall generation. Id.
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generated by the panels is constant over the long term. A homeowner can
lock in peace of mind about electricity rates for years to come.8"
New and unforeseeable uses for some disruptive innovations also
drive demand. Want to purchase a piece of software for your phone?
Push a few buttons, anywhere in the United States, and that "app" is
instantly downloaded to your phone. That was not on anyone's radar
screen in the 1980s when the cell phone network began. Urban solar may
have its own "killer app": if automakers sell more plug-in hybrid vehicles,
consumers could use their own renewable energy facilities to charge their
cars and bypass the gas pumps.8
Solar's advocates have been touting these advantages for years.8"
Critics of an emerging technology can be proven wrong, but only in
hindsight; as noted above, we are better at recognizing disruptiveness
after it has taken place.8 3 In other words, solar looks now like other dis-
ruptive technologies in their early days. Viewed years from now, its
strengths could seem so obvious that it would be difficult to imagine that
electricity had ever been generated any other way.
This tells us that solar is ripe to become a disruptive technology.
Still, we need to account for how best to foster disruptiveness. How does
a product become one that a lot of people demand? Appeals to adopt an
innovation because it is superior to existing technology, or even mandates
to do so, are not enough. Consumers who do not recognize a new tech-
nology's potential need more: an approach that capitalizes on the advan-
tages the technology can offer them.
80. Much research focuses on shortening the "payback period" (the time it takes
to recoup an initial investment in solar technology). See, e.g., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB., PV FAQs (2004), available at http://www.nrel.govldocslfy05ostil37322.pdf (last
visited June 6, 2010) (claiming a payback period of as short as four years for a rooftop PV
system). After that period, the remainder of the lifespan of an average system provides
virtually zero-cost electricity to the owner, with only maintenance costs factored in. That
can be as long as twenty-five years. See Adam Sewall, Why Payback Period Is a Crude
Measurefor Solar Panels, GETsOLAR.cOM, Aug. 20, 2009, http://www.getsolar.com/blog/
payback-period-solar-power-panels/2097.
81. An example of how this could work is found in Kimberly Madrigal, Solar
Paneled HOA: An Association Lets the Sun Shine On, GREENLANDLADY, Jan. 18, 2010,
http://greenlandlady.com/site/success-stories/solar-paneled-hoa-an-association-lets-the-
sun-shine-on (observing that architect Amber Richane, who oversaw the installation of
PV panels on the roof of her condominium building, "was allowed to run power to her
parking spot and can now recharge her GEM car in the building's garage").
82. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has issued numerous
reports on solar technology, analyzing all of the claimed advantages. See Nat'l Renewable
Energy Lab., Energy Analysis-Policy Analysis, http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/policy-
analysis.html (last visited June 6, 2010) (search of "Solar Energy Technologies" under
"Publications' yields over 200 results).
83. This can lead to criticism that disruptiveness theory cannot predict results ex
ante. See Danneels, supra note 12, at 251.
72 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24
2. Matching the Business to the Opportunity
An industry whose products or services are still so complicated and
expensive that only people with a lot of money and expertise can own
and use them is an industry that has not yet been disrupted.84
As Professor Christensen puts it, firms succeed when they reach
consumers by "market[ing] understanding that [m]irrors how
[c]ustomers [e]xperience [l]ife." 8 5 He distinguishes between a "low-end
disruption" and a "new-market disruption."86 The former addresses a
firm's existing customers; the latter (like urban solar) is "an innovation
that enables a larger population of people who previously lacked the
money or skill now to begin buying and using a product."8 " Professor
Erwin Danneels observes that firms fail at popularizing new-market dis-
ruptive technology when they lack marketing competence: the ability to
identify and access customers the company has not previously served.88
Cell phone companies understand this concept. One reason why
cell phones have found widespread adoption is the relative simplicity of
the purchase experience, even for a new customer. "Relative" is an impor-
tant qualifier, as anyone who has dealt with a cell phone carrier can
attest. Cell phone company rate and service plans are not simple,89 and
choosing among companies is not easy, as the smirking television ads of
the strengths and weaknesses of each other's plans remind us. 9° However,
there are still relatively few carriers to choose from 9 and the entire
purchase-to-use process can be completed in an afternoon. Many com-
plex aspects of cell phone operation, such as CDMA, UMTS, and GSM
technical standards that allow cell phones to be used across the nation,
are hidden from the device owner.
92
84. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 41, at 8.
85. Clayton Christensen, Presentation at World Innovation Forum (May 24,
2009), available at http://www.business-strategy-innovation.com/2009/05/top-10-clay-
ton-christensen-insights.html (slide 14 of SlideShare presentation).
86. Christensen & Raynor, supra note 14.
87. Danneels, supra note 12, at 250.
88. Id. at 254.
89. See How to Buy a Cell Phone, PC WORLD, Oct. 13, 2008, available at http://
www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id,125653/prinrable.html (listing different features
to look for in cell phones and stating that "just getting one can be a huge hassle").
90. See, e.g., Sprint Television Commercial, Just Phone Calls, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=KVeFm-zEQ8 (last visited May 10, 2010) (discussing the difference
between Sprint's plan and other plans).
91. This is particularly true if a consumer wants a specific phone, given exclusivity
deals that have become common. See In re Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Litig., 385 F.
Supp. 2d 403 (2005) (involving a challenge to this practice).
92. See, e.g., Heath Row, The History and Lessons of the Cellular Industry, FAST
COMPANY, Mar. 13, 2004, http://www.fastcompany.com/blog/heath-row/history-and-
lessons-cellular-industry (noting that consumers "don't care about TDMA, GSM, or
CDMA, they just want it to work fast, at a competitive price, and at high quality").
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Contrast this to the likely experience of a homeowner who has the
best intentions of installing a solar panel on her roof. The experience will
never be as simple as waltzing into a cell phone store and walking out
with a device, but at present it occupies the extreme other end of the
spectrum, with a troubling lack of standardization. Every homeowner
who wants to install solar starts virtually from scratch, as if she were
building a custom home, and with a steep learning curve.
93
A homeowner needs a wide variety of skills to assess what equip-
ment might be suitable for her house, what it would take to install it, and
even from whom to purchase it. There is no standard solar panel prod-
uct, but a range of products available from competing manufacturers and
distributors.9 4 Choosing from among them is a complex undertaking.
95
We're not talking about installing carpet in a bedroom-this is a sophis-
ticated set of technical and electrical tasks that requires skills beyond the
reach of many homeowners. And, unlike the cell phone experience, a
solar installation burdens the consumer with difficult legal and technical
challenges.
Throughout the United States, there is a near complete lack of a
standard way to get solar technology. The homeowner must work with a
contractor to figure out what type and size of system to purchase, what
will be needed to install the new equipment, and so on. Requiring the
consumer to evaluate the technology is as daunting as requiring her to
judge ignition systems before buying a car.96 The jargon ("inverter,"
"photovoltaic array," and so on) is enough to deter many. Numerous
93. See, e.g., George Musser, Should You Get Solar Now, or Wait?, Solar at Home,
Sci. AM., Dec. 8, 2009, http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=should-
you-get-solar-now-or-wait- 2 0 0 9-12-08 ("Right now, you need a good deal of patience
and fortitude to install solar panels.").
94. GetSolar.com maintains a national database of professional solar installers
searchable by state. See GetSolar.com, http://www.getsolar.com (last visited June 6,
2010). Not all installers are alike, however. A Consumer's Guide issued by the Depart-
ment of Energy provides the following under "Selecting a PV Provider":
In some areas, finding a PV provider can be as simple as picking up the tele-
phone directory and looking under "Solar Energy Equipment and Systems-
Dealers." However, many of the listings are solar water-heating companies and
many companies might not be experienced in PV system design or installation.
Similarly, many electrical contractors, although proficient in typical electrical
contracting work, might not have expertise in PV or residential roof-mounting
techniques.
U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, ENERGY EFFC'Y AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, A CONSUMER'S
GUIDE: GET YOUR POWER FROM THE SUN 13 (2003).
95. See, e.g., Dave Llorens, Nine Crucial Solar Installer Considerations (Dec. 22,
2007), http://www.solarpowerrocks.com/solar-trends/what-to-look-for-in-a-solar-installer
(last visited June 6, 2010).
96. See, e.g., Solar Panels Guide, http://www.solarpanelsguide.org/ (last visited
June 6, 2010) (offering links for consumers to learn about "Solar Panel Installers," "Solar
Panel Mounts," "Solar Panel Inverters," "Solar Panel Distributors," and "Solar Panel
Manufacturers").
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solar companies operate at the size and scale of local HVAC contractors,
which makes every installation a new one with little precedent.9 7 The
installation also puts the consumer in the position of dealing with multi-
ple entities: the solar installer, the electric utility to which the panel will
be connected, and the local government or neighborhood association (or
both) that will approve the land use.
Even though professional assistance is available, anecdotal evidence
suggests that people simply give up at this stage.98 It does not help that
an Internet search yields many sites that advocate a hardy, do-it-yourself
approach to installing solar. That reinforces the perception that home
solar is for resourceful tinkerers, the Dr. Emmett Browns of the world. 99
Personal computers did not become widespread in the 1970s when engi-
neers were assembling their own motherboards in their garages.
Many people are reluctant to have workers come to their homes to
do anything, much less a lengthy construction project. In today's busy
world, homeowners have to juggle schedule commitments to be home at
the right times to supervise work. It is one thing to set aside an afternoon
for the "cable guy," and quite another to monitor an ongoing project.
Finding a reputable contractor is always an important consideration, and
many homeowners will insist on a longer track record than most solar
installers can demonstrate.1 ° ° In many metropolitan areas, few compa-
nies are fully devoted to solar, and even fewer have long-term track
records.' 0 ' A certification association, the North American Board of Cer-
tified Energy Practitioners (NABCEP), sets national standards for solar
photovoltaic installers, but as of March 2010 there were only 1091
97. The sobering experience of Scientific American editor George Musser, cited
throughout this Article, is hardly atypical, as he notes. George Musser, Solar Snafu: The
Contractor Finally Installs the Panels, but Goofi, Solar at Home, Sci. AM., Oct. 22, 2009,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=solar-snafu-the-contractor-finally-
2009-10-22 (observing that "solar is still not a matter of plug and play," that Musser is-
rather unexpectedly-an "early adopter," and that the installation industry is suffering
"teething pains" on a "learning curve").
98. The title of one blog post on consumer reluctance to adopt solar is self-explan-
atory: David Llorens, Why No One Has Solar Power, SoLARowERRocKs.coM, Jan. 26,
2008, http://www.solarpowerrocks.com/solar-trends/why-no-one-has-solar-power/.
99. Dr. Brown was the "mad" scientist in BACK TO THE FuTURE (Universal Pic-
tures 1985). See Philip E. Ross, Loser: Why the Chevy Volt Will Fizzle, IEEE SPECTRUM,
Jan. 2010, http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/advanced-cars/loser-why-the-chevy-volt-
will-fizzle (satirizing "tech-minded people ... who tile their roofs with photovoltaic cells,
harvest the energy they expend on their StairMasters, or live underground in hobbit holes
to conserve heat").
100. George Musser selected the company 1st Light Energy for his installation in
New Jersey. George Musser, What You Really Need to Install Solar: A CPA, Solar at Home,
Sci. AM., Jun. 4, 2009, http://www.scientificamerican.com/blog/post.cfm?id=what-you-
really-need-to-install-sol-2009-06-04. 1st Light claims on its website that its five-year
existence makes it "one of the most experienced solar companies in the Nation." 1st Light
Energy, http://lsdightenergy.com/about.html (last visited May 10, 2010).
101. Musser, supra note 100.
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NABCEP-certified professionals in the entire country. 11 2 Even using a
certified professional is no guarantee of a smooth installation process.
10 3
Home systems break and need repairs. If a homeowner cannot be
guaranteed that a company will be around years later when service is
needed, she might balk from the outset at making the installation. Few
homeowners will relish going up on their roofs to check on malfunction-
ing systems. The classic cure for this, the word-of-mouth recommenda-
tion about reliability, is also difficult to find if large numbers of
homeowners have not installed solar. This is a chicken-and-egg problem
for which no existing state or federal incentive for renewables has a
solution.
In many jurisdictions homeowners seeking to put solar on their
roofs will also need lawyers, because they'll face NIMBY-like opposition
from neighbors who will invoke state and local land use laws to delay or
quash projects.1" 4 One person's good deed for the environment can be
another's eyesore. This problem can be particularly acute in the numer-
ous subdivisions governed by neighborhood covenants, some of which
can be interpreted to prohibit renewable energy systems.1 ° 5 Some states
have enacted laws that prohibit the most egregious forms of blocking
renewable energy systems,1"6 but even these laws allow wiggle room for
neighborhood associations to bar solar installations.10 7
102. North American Board of Certified Energy Practitioners, http://www.
nabcep.org/ (last visited June 6, 2010).
103. See, e.g., Musser, supra note 100. The title says it all.
104. See Michael L. Pisauro Jr., Renewables and Land Use Law, 23 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 39 (Summer 2008); Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 640. The type of
local control over renewable energy facilities varies widely from state to state. See id. at
673.
105. A typical story may be found in Paula Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Priva-
tization, Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of the Community, 47 VILL. L. REv. 553,
574 (2002) ("For example, in an Arizona planned community, one neighbor turned in
another for installing a modest solar panel. The association declared the installation an
eyesore and demanded its removal. A lawsuit erupted, generating more than $100,000 in
legal fees. The resident won, 'but the association vows to fight on.'") (quoting Matthew
Benjamin, Hi, Neighbor, Want to Get Together? Let's Meet in Court!, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Oct. 30, 2000, at 57).
106. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 673 (discussing these state prohibitions). At a
symposium on renewable energy, Virginia state legislator David Bulova described how the
Governor's Commission on Climate Change rejected a proposal for a state law to override
existing covenants, due to the political difficulties involved. Del. David Bulova, Discussion
of House Bill 1994 and Virginia Initiatives, in Annual Symposium, Diversify Your Portfo-
lio: Regulating Energy Sources with Renewable Energy Portfolio Standards, WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. (Jan. 29, 2010) (notes on file with author).
107. In Nevada, for example, "[alny covenant, restriction or condition contained
in a deed, contract or other legal instrument which affects the transfer, sale or any other
interest in real property that prohibits or unreasonably restricts the owner of the property
from using a system for obtaining solar or wind energy on his property is void and
unenforceable." NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 111.239 (Supp. 2007). See Debbie Leonard,
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All of this is before considering a system's upfront cost. Unless there
is an incentive in place to fully finance the system, this cost can run into
the tens of thousands of dollars. The payback of a few dollars per month
on an electric bill over the long term can appear too subde or ephemeral.
There is considerable research on why consumers do not adopt renewable
energy systems and energy conservation measures, and much of it focuses
on how consumers ignore long-term rates of return even when they are
higher than market rates. 1 °8 Asking Americans to consider the long term
in purchasing a home improvement ignores the reality that we are a
mobile society and many of us move every few years.'0 9 It is the genius of
the cell phone pricing structure that carriers have effectively reversed the
perception of cost: the upfront cost of the device is low, with carrier
subsidies reducing the cost to essentially nominal, but the long-term cost
of a two-year cell phone contract can be quite high.11 °
It is no wonder why all but those most determined to install solar
on their roofs eventually give up. The situation resembles that of many
homeowners who are interested in major home improvement projects
but abandon them because of their expense and complexity. A solar
installation is different in that promoting environmental protection will
motivate some, but limiting residential solar to that subset of homeown-
ers is too constraining. We need incentives that galvanize a large, latent
and unexpressed demand in a simpler, better way.
IV. EXISTING INCENTIVES' POTENTIAL FOR
PROMOTING DISRUPTIVENESS
Those incentives must do two things. First, they must streamline
the purchase experience. Buying solar must become the equivalent of an
impulse purchase, not a major home improvement project. Second, we
Legal Tools to Protect Access to Solar and Wind Resources, 17 NEv. LAw. 14 (2009). One
person's "unreasonably restricts" can easily be another's "reasonably."
108. Sachs, supra note 4, at 309; Fuller et al., supra note 3 (noting that regulatory
measures to promote renewables and conservation are typically aimed at making rates of
return more favorable).
109. Jeffrey J. Kuenzi & Jason P. Schacter, Seasonality of Moves and The Duration
and Tenure of Residence: 1996 (U.S. Census Bureau, Populating Division Working Paper
Series No. 69, 2002), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/documenta-
tion/twps0069/twpsoo69.html#dor (demonstrating that the average American stays in
the same house for less than five years, and that 70% of Americans spend ten years or less
in the same home).
110. To take just one example, a simple search was performed on the Verizon
Wireless website. Verizon Wireless, http://www.verizonwireless.com (follow "Phones &
Accessories: Cell Phones: 3G Smartphones" hyperlink) (last visited June 6, 2010) (dem-
onstrating that a 3G Smartphone may be purchased for $9.99 after rebate and two-year
contract agreement); Verizon Wireless, http://www.verizonwireless.com (follow "Plans:
Family" hyperlink) (last visited June 6, 2010) (demonstrating that two lines cost $120 a
month, requiring a $2400 commitment with the purchase of the 3G Smartphone for
$9.99).
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must cut the upfront cost to the point where consumers will not be
deterred by it. Companies that provide television service to the home
understand this: get service in place at low cost and homeowners become
reluctant to let it go, but make it expensive from the outset and they
balk.
How well do existing state and federal programs and incentives
address these issues? Not all that well, as it turns out.
A. Tax Credits, Rebates, and Similar Financing Incentives
For decades, both states and the federal government have offered
financial incentives for the purchase of renewable energy systems.'11
States have offered rebates and tax incentives such as reduced or
exempted property taxes and exemptions from state sales tax on
purchases of renewable energy equipment.' 12 The sheer variety of these
incentives, 1 1 3 not to mention the paperwork burden associated with
applying for some of them, can be enough to deter those unfamiliar with
them.
Federal tax incentives have been in place inconsistently since the
initial push to promote renewables in the late 1970s and early 1980s.1
14
The Energy Tax Act of 1978 created tax credits for residential solar and
wind installations, but the credits expired at the end of 1985.' 15 The
Energy Policy Act of 2005 reinstated a federal tax credit for residential
111. See DSIRE, supra note 11, for a complete summary of these and other incen-
tives and programs that promote renewable energy.
112. Id. (searchable by individual state's credits and deductions). See also JASON
COUGHLIN & KARLYNN GORY, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., SOLAR PHOTOVOL-
TAlC FINANCING: RESIDENTIAL SECTOR DEPLOYMENT 15 (2009), available at http://
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/44853.pdf (providing a map of states offering credits and
deductions).
113. For an exhaustive collection of terminology, see A Solar Incentive by Any
Other Name .. , SOLARPOWERROCKS.COM, http://www.solarpowerrocks.com/
solar-trends/a-solar-incentive-by-any-other-name... (last visited June 6, 2010).
114. Other federal incentives for a consumer's purchase of renewable energy tech-
nology include energy efficient mortgages (EEM) through various programs of the Fed-
eral Housing Administration, Department of Veterans Affairs, and Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac (for conventional mortgages not backed by a federal agency). See, e.g.,
Energy Efficient FHA Loans, FHA.coM, http://www.fha.com/energyefficient.cfm (last
visited June 6, 2010). They also include loan grants and guarantees for farmers from the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)'s Rural Energy for America Program ("REAP").
See generally USDA Rural Development, http:// www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/farmbill (last
visited May 10, 2010).
115. This end to the tax credits had an obvious impact on solar installers, as one
California-based firm discusses on its website. ACS, About ACS, http://www.avsolar.
comlacsinfo.htm (last visited May 10, 2010) ("The solar glory days ended abruptly at
midnight January 31, 1985 when the federal solar tax credits expired. Within 6 months,
90% of the U.S. solar industry expired as well.").
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renewable energy systems."1 6 A taxpayer may claim a credit of thirty per-
cent of qualified expenditures for a residential renewable energy sys-
tem.'17 The credit was initially applied to solar electric systems, solar
water heating systems, and fuel cells, but the Energy Improvement and
Extension Act of 2008 extended it to small wind energy systems and
geothermal heat pumps."1 8 The American Reinvestment and Recovery
Act of 2009 (ARRA) expanded the availability of the credit by removing
the maximum credit amount for all eligible technologies except fuel cells
placed in service after 2008.'19 This is significant because the credit had
been capped at $2000, and typical systems cost far more than the credit
amount. 1
20
The ARRA might lead to a more stable tax policy environment for
renewable energy, though that is only guaranteed through 2013,121 and a
Congress concerned about overall federal revenue could easily choose to
discontinue the credit. The on-again, off-again experience with the pro-
duction tax credit for commercial renewables facilities,12 2 and the incon-
sistency of residential tax credits since 1978, should give one pause for
thought.
The number of homeowners who have taken advantage of tax cred-
its and other financing incentives is still relatively small. 1 23 This should
not be surprising. The amount of the credit can be substantial but still
leaves the cost of a typical system at $10,000 or more, with a payback
period that (even accounting for a break in electric rates through a feed-
in tariff, as described below) is still long. 1 24
116. Energy Policy Act of 2005, 109 Pub. L. 58, 119 Stat. 594, 1033 (2005)
("Sec. 25D. RESIDENTIAL ENERGY EFFICIENT PROPERTY. "(a) ALLOWANCE OF
CREDIT.-In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax
imposed by this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal to the sum of-"(1) 30
percent of the qualified photovoltaic property expenditures made by the taxpayer during
such year ....
117. Id
118. This Act was part of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
106, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
119. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. 111-5, § 1122, 123 Stat.
115 (2009).
120. See, e.g., COUGHLIN & GORY, supra note 112, at 14 (examining incentives
for a "4 kW residential system with an initial cost of $33,000").
121. Jeffry S. Hinman, The Green Economic Recovery: Wind Energy Tax Policy After
Financial Crisis and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, 24 J. ENVTL.
L. & LING. 35, 57-58 (2009) (noting that the Production Tax Credit expires at the end
of 2012).
122. Id. at 47-62 (featuring an excellent historical treatment of this issue).
123. COUGHLIN & CORY, supra note 112, at 27 (noting that "traditional methods
of financing residential PV have been insufficient to drive material levels of installed
capacity at the residential level").
124. Id. at 18-23 (examining several case studies and noting that only in New
Jersey, with state SREC financing, was it possible to recover more than system cost over a
twenty-year period).
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Here is a sample analysis, using the new initiatives from utility DTE
Energy Co. in Detroit:
125
To be on the conservative side, let's say we have a 5 kW system
that costs $40,000, pre-incentives. (Unless you're in an especially
aggressive, competitive region for solar, most installers will quote
you $7.50 to $8 per watt for a non-utility-scale solar photovoltaic
system, before incentives. If you've experienced differently, please
let us know!) Here's how we would calculate the potential rebates:
• Starting price: 5,000 x $8 = $40,000
• Renewable Energy Credit (REC) Repayment: $2.40/watt x
[5,000] watts = $12,000
" Federal renewable energy tax credit, usually calculated as
30 percent of gross: $40,000 x 0.30 = $12,000
" You pay: $40,000 - (2 x $12,000) = $16,000
This figure is of course hypothetical, and your actual net cost
would be even lower than this, thanks to Detroit Edison's ongoing
$0.11 /kWh repayment for the actual power your system generates,
which will appear as a credit on your monthly electric bill for the
next 20 years.12 6
In this case, both the utility and federal government have offered
substantial incentives, but the system still costs $16,000. Most home-
owners are unwilling to spend that much up front, no matter what sav-
ings they will see on their electric bills. 127
Moreover, there is no "typical" system. It takes considerable legwork
on a homeowner's part to work with a contractor to determine the sys-
tem's size, the cost, and the credit's value. 128 Firms are willing to provide
estimates, but they must survey prospective job sites to evaluate the
numerous variables that determine what systems would be appropriate.
By contrast, a consumer can determine the value of the federal tax credit
for the purchase of a hybrid vehicle in a few minutes through a simple
Internet search. A related problem is that a solar panel installation is a
pure investment with no substitution possibilities. A prospective hybrid
vehicle buyer can compare two price tags and decide whether the hybrid
car is more affordable with the credit than a conventional one. Prospec-
125. Shining a Spotlight on Detroit's Solar Incentives, SOLaFEEDS.COM, Jan. 19,
2010, http://www.getsolar.com/blog/shining-a-spotlight-on-detroitE2%80%99s-solar-
incentives/3218.
126. Id. As a recent study by the NREL notes, the Detroit example is not unique:
a residential PV project is only financially viable at present for a homeowner if a combi-
nation of financing tools is used. See COUGHLIN & CORY, supra note 112, at 18-23.
127. Fuller et al., supra note 3 ("The psychological burden of a large payment may
also be significant, especially to reduce an expense such as a utility bill, which is often a
small percentage of total expenditures for individuals and businesses.").
128. See, e.g., SunRun Corp., Get Started, http://www.sunrunhome.com/get-
started (last visited June 12, 2010) (describing the steps involved).
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tive solar homeowners face the much more difficult calculation of balanc-
ing the discounted upfront cost against the savings on future electric
bills.
This calculus is probably more like deciding to take on a home
improvement project, with its cost likely to be evaluated against a differ-
ent metric: whether it would affect the house's price at resale. A home-
owner may perceive that she will recoup most of the cost of a remodeled
kitchen on the resale market, but even with financial incentives, she may
not feel the same about a solar system.12 9 As a result, many homeowners
will spend their money on projects other than renewable energy
systems. 130
B. Feed-In Tariffi
A different financial approach finding some recent support in the
United States is the feed-in tariff (FIT), a fixed amount paid to a renewa-
ble power producer, established in advance. 13' Unlike the avoided cost
approach established in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (PURPA), 132 anyone with a renewable energy system can receive a
FIT payment, not just a "qualifying facility" (PURPA's term for a small
power producer that meets statutory and regulatory criteria).1 33 Under
the typical FIT structure, modeled after that in place in European coun-
tries such as Germany and Denmark for a number of years, 134 renewable
energy projects are guaranteed interconnection with the electricity grid,
and project owners are paid an above-market rate locked in for a specific
term of years (in Germany, twenty years). The rate can take one of sev-
eral forms, such as a fixed amount defined in advance, or a premium over
the wholesale price of electricity. 135 This prompts many to support the
FIT idea for its potential to spur a boom in urban solar, as FITs can pay
129. Sachs, supra note 4, at 309 (noting that consumers ignore future benefits of
renewable energy and energy efficiency improvements).
130. Fuller et al., supra note 3 ("Up-front costs can even cause individuals with
access to capital to decline a project, as they may prefer to spend their money on higher-
priority items.").
131. WILSON RICKERSON ET AL., FEED-IN TARIFFS AND RENEWABLE ENERGY IN
THE USA-A POLICY UPDATE 1 n. 1 (2008) ('The term 'feed-in tariff derives from the
German Stromeinspeisungsgesetz of 1990, which literally translated means 'electricity feed-
ing-in law.'").
132. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat.
3117 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 2601-2645 (2010)). The avoided
cost approach is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3.
133. FERC Regulations Under Sections 201 and 210 of the Public Utilities Regu-
latory Policies Act of 1978, 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.101(b)(1), 292.204 (2010).
134. RICKERSON ET AL., supra note 131, at 2-3.
135. Id.
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anyone for electricity generated from renewables, whether or not it serves
any load.1
36
Efforts to establish FITs are underway in a number of states,' 3 7 and
there have been proposals for federal FITs, 138 although the main climate
bills under consideration favor the RPS approach.' 39 Unlike the FIT,
which focuses on setting the right price for electricity generated from
renewables, an RPS mandates how much of a utility's demand must be
met with generation from its renewable energy facilities, or certificates
that it purchases from another generator.' 4 ° This basic difference in the
regulatory approach has led to discussion about whether FITs are supe-
rior to RPS for promoting renewables,' 4 ' including an ongoing debate
between Professors Lincoln Davies and Jim Rossi.' 42 Observers of the
European experience conclude that the stability of FIT payments pro-
136. Glenn Harris, Net-metering or Feed-in Tariff? Can They Co-exist?, RENEW-
ABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.renewableenergyworld.comrea/
news/article/2008/09/net-metering-or-feed-in-tariff-can-they-co-exist-5 3 6 18.
137. RiCKERSON ET AL., supra note 131, at 2; KARLYNN CORY ET AL., NAT'L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FEED-IN TARIFF POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND
RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS 1 (2009).
138. Slocum, supra 13, at 13 (describing the bills proposed by Rep. Jay Inslee (D-
WA)).
139. The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (commonly known as
"Waxman-Markey") would establish a "combined efficiency and renewable electricity
standard" of 20% by 2020, with up to eight percent coming from efficiency measures and
as litde as twelve percent from renewable power sources. American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009).
140. CORY et al., supra note 137, at 8.
141. See, e.g., Letter from Kellyn Eberhardt, Envtl. Defense Fund, to Fla. Pub.
Svc. Comm'n, (Aug. 26, 2008), available at http:l/www.wind-works.org/FeedLaws/USA/
EDF%20PSC%2OComments%2008-26-08.pdf ("Evidence is mounting that a REP
[renewable energy payment] policy far outweighs other procurement models for the large-
scale adoption of renewable energy technologies.").
142. Compare Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National
RPS, 42 CONN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (advocating a national RPS) with Rossi,
supra note 33 (opposing it). Other articles advocating a national RPS include Benjamin
K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State Renewable Porflio Stan-
dards (RPS), 15 BUFF. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 9-10 (2008); Christopher Cooper, A National
Renewable Poqfrlio Standard. Politically Correct or Just Plain Correct?, 21 ELECTRICITY J. 9
(2008); Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L J. 49 (2008);
Robin J. Lunt, Recharging US. Energy Policy: Advocating for a National Renewable Portfo-
lio Standard, 25 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 371, 402-03 (2007).
One argument against a national RPS is that it is not the best means of reducing
carbon emissions. A 2009 study by three Department of Energy researchers concludes
that a national RPS would be an "imperfect substitute" for comprehensive climate legisla-
tion because it does not direcdy mandate reduced use of fossil fuels. AUDREY LEE ET AL.,
REGIONAL IMPACTS OF A NATIONAL RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD (2009), availa-
ble at http:/lwww.usaee.org/usaee2009/submissions/ExtendedAbs/AudreyLee.doc. See
also ELECTRIC POWER RES. INST., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CAuIoFRI CIMATE INI-
TIATwES: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH (2007), available at http://mydocs.epri.com/docs/
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vides greater incentives than the RPS structure.'4 3 China is gradually
moving toward FIT-like mechanisms for renewable resources, 144 which
suggests that it is rethinking the wisdom of mandating the growth of
renewables through RPS-like mechanisms.
A number of states have considered FITs, but by 2009, only Califor-
nia, Washington and Vermont had adopted them. 14 5 Vermont's law is
the most like the German model, with different rates paid for different
technologies and project sizes, and set at the cost of generation plus profit
at a "reasonable rate of return" for long-term contracts. 4 6 Gainesville,
Florida has perhaps the most aggressive European-style FIT, with its
regional utility paying $0.32 per kWh for solar PV (about three times the
cost of electricity in Florida as a whole).1 4 7 FITs' slow growth is not
surprising, as they are politically dicey. Their costs are passed on to all of
a local utility's customers, who subsidize those who have taken advantage
of the payments. This will inevitably lead opponents to tag FIT proposals
as "anti-competitive."' 48 As Professor Davies notes, the FIT takes on
public/000000000001014641.pdf (reaching a comparable conclusion with respect to
programs being undertaken in California).
143. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLI-
MATE CHANGE 366 (2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern-review_
report.htm (last visited June 6, 2010) ("Comparisons between deployment support
through tradable quotas and feed-in tariff price support suggest that feed-in mechanisms
achieve larger deployment at lower costs. Central to this is the assurance of long-term
price guarantees."). This is popularly known as the "Stern Report."
144. Eisen, China's Renewable Energy Law, supra note 28.
145. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, CPUC Approves Feed-In Tariffs to
Support Development of Onsite Renewable Generation, Feb. 14, 2008, available at
http:l/docs.cpuc.ca.gov/wordpdf/NEWS-RELEASE/78824.pdf (discussing California's
adoption of feed-in tariffs); Phil Taylor, House Will Get Another Shot at Feed-In Tariffi,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/08/O3/03greenwire-
house-will-get-another-shot-at-feed-in-tariffs-70749.html (stating that Vermont, as of
Aug. 3, 2009, was the only state to fully adopt feed-in tariffs). See also John Perkins,
Comment, Overcoming Jurisdictional Obstacles to Feed-In Tariffi in the United States, 40
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 97 (2009) (discussing U.S. FITs and proposals for additional
ones).
146. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 8005 (2010); see Paul Gipe, Vermont FITs Become
Law: The Mouse That Roared, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, June 1, 2009, http://
www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/06/vermont-fits-become-law-the-
mouse-that-roared.
147. GAINESVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE 080566 (2009) (offering up to $0.32 per
kWh). The average retail rate of electricity for residential customers in Florida in Febru-
ary 2010 was 11.53 cents per kWh. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AVERAGE RETAIL PRICE
OF ELECTRICITY TO ULTIMATE CUSTOMERS BY END-USE SECTOR, BY STATE, February
2010 and 2009, available at http://www.eia.doe.govlcneaf/electricitylepm/table5-6_a.
html (last visited June 12, 2010).
148. Zac Anderson, As Florida Shifts to Solar, a Fight Looms, HERALD TRIBUNE,
Mar. 22. 2009, at Al, available at http:llwww.heraldtribune.comlartide/20090322/
ARTICLE/903221081 (citing comments opposing a FIT proposal in Florida by utility
Florida Power and Light).
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"perhaps the heaviest burden in the American political lexicon-the
moniker of 'tax."' 149 The FIT can also have adverse distributional conse-
quences. The payments will go to more affluent customers who can
afford the solar systems, but the utility might raise rates on all of its
customers, poor and wealthy, to compensate for the payments.
15 °
If the FIT would ensure rapid growth in urban solar, then it would
be worth countering these arguments. In Germany and Denmark, the
payments have led to rapid increases in solar residential installations.151
Germany more than doubled its national supply of electricity produced
from renewables between 2000 and 2007, and met its 2010 target three
years ahead of schedule. 152 However, like all government subsidies, the
FIT depends on continuing governmental support, and the German sub-
sidy is reportedly about to be cut substantially.
153
The FIT also does not address the substantial upfront cost of the
technology or the installation costs. 154 It is like offering a consumer a
rebate on cellular phone service and expecting that she will purchase the
phone. The FIT might be useful in combination with other policies, but
on its own it is not a recipe for success. One possible solution involves
rebates and tax credits working in combination with the FIT to make
solar more attractive. They subsidize the equipment, with the FIT lessen-
ing the payback period.
As mentioned above, consumers will still balk at the upfront cost of
the technology. 155 Assuming they are willing to go forward, they remain
in the position of dealing with multiple entities: the utility that will
purchase electricity from them, the local, state, or federal government
that offers tax benefits or rebates, and the installer who will provide the
hardware. Nothing about an FIT alleviates this problem. 156 Giving
149. Davies, supra note 142.
150. Rossi, supra note 33, at 8-9.
151. JOHN FARRELL, NEW RULES PROJECT, FEED-IN TARIFFS IN AMERICA: DPuV-
ING THE ECONOMY WITH RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY THAT WORKS 8-12 (2009),
available at www.boell.de/downloads/ecology/FIT-in-America web.pdf.
152. Id. at 12.
153. Germany's Solar Industry Worried About Future in Wake of Subsidy Cuts,
DEUTSCHE WELLE, Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,
5153447,00.html.
154. CORY ET AL., supra note 137.
155. See supra Part IV.B.
156. Here is a comment on Britain's plan to implement a national FIT:
Let me know the financial calculations of ............
[T]he installation cost - the grant (if available) - maintenance & expected
system life span (1 year manufactures [sic] warranty?) after which it's down to
you to either foot the bill or take out insurance for repair.
The end product in an ideal world is free energy and low carbon
footprint.
In reality a complicated home system like condensing boilers that cost a
fortune to maintain and are beyond economic repair after 5 or so years. [sic]
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homeowners money over the long term to generate electricity from the
system does not relieve them of the responsibility of becoming general
contractors.
C. Property Tax Financing (PACE)
Property tax financing (also referred to as "property assessed clean
energy" or "PACE") is different in that it addresses the upfront cost. It
allows local governments to provide property owners the option of
installing renewable energy projects and paying for them over a period of
years by adding specified amounts to their property tax bills. 157 Project
funding comes from special tax bonds repaid through taxes collected on
the property tax bills of participating owners.1 58 California pioneered this
approach, 159 and as of 2010, eighteen states had laws that allow their
counties and cities to establish special assessment districts for energy
financing.16 These laws typically permit cities and counties to create
energy financing districts, define types of projects eligible for financing,
and give authority to the cities and counties to issue the bonds for
financing.16 '
This is idea is gonna cost you £££'s in the end unless you know how to design
and build and maintain your own system.
Posting of Smugtory to GUARDIAN.CO.UK.COM, http://www.guardian.co.uklenviron-
ment/2010/jan/27/feed-in-tariffs-renewable-energy (Jan. 27 2010, 17:57 GMT).
157. THE WHITE HOUSE, POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR PACE FINANCING PRO-
GRAMS 2 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/PACEPrin-
ciples.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE FRAMEWORK] ("Property owners that benefit from
the improvement then repay the bond through property assessments, secured by a prop-
erty lien and paid as a part of the property taxes .... This local-government energy
financing structure would allow property owners to 'opt-in' to attach up to 100% of the
cost of energy improvements to their property tax bill."); id. at 6 ("Additional protections
come from the year-by-year nature of the property tax lien if a borrower defaults.").
158. Id. at 2.
159. California's Clean Energy Municipal Financing Law was the first PACE stat-
ute. Fuller et al., supra note 3, at 2; see generally CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §5898.20-.32
(2010).
160. These states are California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE §5898.20-.32
(WEST 2010); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-601.5 (West 2009); FLA. STAT.
§ 189.400-.429 (2009); HAw. REV. STAT. § 46-80 (2009): 65 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/1-1-
11 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §33:130.790-.793 (2009); MD. CODE ANN. ART. 24
§ 9-1502 (West 2010); NEv. REv. STAT. § 271.010 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-55C-
1-8 (West 2009); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw. § 119-gg (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 153A-210.4-210.7 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1710.01-.13 (West
2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 19 § 460.1-.7 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 223.387-.399 (2009);
TxX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 376.001-.008 (Vernon 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 30,
§ 8002-8003 (2009); VA. CODE. ANN. §15.2-958.3 (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 66.0627 (West 2009).
161. WHITE HOUSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 157, at 2.
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In 2009, the ARRA removed one potential disincentive to property
tax financing. Previously, the federal tax code prohibited individuals or
businesses receiving "subsidized energy financing" from receiving federal
incentives for renewable energy projects, such as tax credits. The ARRA
ends this prohibition for home and business owners who finance their
projects with taxable municipal bonds.
Property tax financing seems to eliminate the solar system's upfront
cost, as a homeowner pays nothing up front and the city or county offers
100 percent financing. Because the debt is repaid through the property
tax, if the homeowner moves before the system's payoff period, the debt
simply continues to be repaid by the next owner. The obligation is meant
to attach to the land, not the borrower, and to run with the land until
paid off.162 However, it is not clear that the obligation would transfer, as
it depends on state servitudes laws.
1 63
PACE could attract some homeowners, but the system is not "free,"
as its cost is recouped through a special assessment on the homeowner's
property tax bill.164 The question then becomes whether homeowners
will object to that. PACE could provide the same perception to consum-
ers that the upfront cost has disappeared because it has been amortized
over time, like the practice of cell phone companies that spread the cost
of a phone over two years or more. 165 This makes PACE inherently more
attractive than tax credits and rebates. The PACE obligation is compara-
ble to taking on a second mortgage, and because Americans move so
often, homeowners might discount an obligation that spans decades into
the future. This is what PACE proponents effectively hope for when they
assert the obligation will run to subsequent homeowners.
Because PACE is so new, however, no evidence shows that a con-
sumer would perceive spreading out the payments as painless. And while
consumers may be willing to take on second mortgages to make home
improvements because they perceive that housing is a good investment,
they may be less willing to take on PACE obligations if the returns are
not as obvious. Cell phone contracts involve one-time payments for
hardware, while in this case the homeowner would see a reminder every
time she sends in a property tax bill that she still owes on the obligation.
On a typical 5 kW, $40,000 system, the extra taxes would be $2,000 per
162. Id. ("The assessment runs with the property at law and successor owners are
responsible for remaining balances.").
163. See 1-60 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.04 (Michael Allan
Wolf ed. 2009) (noting that servitudes are enforceable only if specific requirements met).
164. Chris Lynch et al., Berkeley FIRST, Presentation at UC Berkeley School of
Law, Boalt Hall, Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency Financing (Apr. 9, 2009) (copy
on file with author).
165. This would be consistent with research showing the importance of net pre-
sent value to consumers contemplating solar and energy efficiency improvements. Fuller
et al., supra note 3, at 2.
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year for 20 years, which is not an inconsiderable sum. Another possible
concern is that some states would require homeowners to disclose the
higher property tax obligation at the time of resale, which might give
some prospective buyers second thoughts.
The limited experience with PACE to date suggests that the availa-
bility of full upfront financing prompts some homeowners to go forward
with solar installations. In 2008, Berkeley, California became the first
city in the nation to establish a property tax financing program. One year
later, the program had funded thirty-eight solar projects. 166 By 2010,
eleven cities and counties in California, and four others nationwide had
established similar programs.167 In March 2010, San Francisco's program
launched with $150 million in funding.168
Extending the idea to a national scale, as Vice President Biden pro-
posed in 2009,169 would be extremely Costly. 170 In addition, a form of
regulatory commons problem seems likely to hamper widespread adop-
tion of PACE beyond those states and cities where it has already
begun. 17 1 PACE requires cities to proactively create new institutions. It
requires state legislatures to empower cities to create special assessment
districts, and it requires the cities to take action on their part of the two-
step process.1 72 They cannot rely on existing agencies and finance mecha-
166. The $1.5 million pilot phase of the Berkeley FIRST financing program sold
out in nine minutes. Chris Lynch et al., supra note 164.
167. The eleven cities and counties in California with PACE financing programs
are Alameda, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Palm Desert, San Diego, San Francisco, Santa Bar-
bara, Santa Cruz, Santa Monica, Solana Beach and Sonoma County. Programs are in
place or planned in Boulder, Colorado; Annapolis and Montgomery Counties, Maryland;
Santa Fe, New Mexico; Athens, Ohio; and Babylon, New York. WHITE HousE FRAME-
WORK, supra note 157, at 3.
168. SF Green-Lights Country's Biggest PACE Program, VOTE SOLAR INITIATIVE,
Feb. 8, 2010, http://votesolar.org/2010/02/sf-green-lights-pace-program.
169. Vice President Biden announced a "Recovery Through Retrofit" initiative to
create a national program based on the Berkeley model. Carolyn Jones, Biden to Model
Solar Finance Plan on Berkeley's, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 20, 2009, at C2. A set of policy
principles and analysis of existing programs can be found in the WHITE HousE FRAME-
WORK, supra note 157.
170. By one estimate, it would take $280 billion to fund "energy-efficiency and
solar upgrades in fifteen percent of residential buildings in the United States." Fuller et
al., supra note 3, at 10.
171. See generally William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A The-
ory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IowA L. REV. 1 (2003). Professor Buzbee uses the term "regu-
latory commons" to describe the lack of regulatory leadership that results when multiple
levels and agencies of government have responsibility for addressing a particular problem.
He observes that one result may be "predictable incentives in complex, multi-layered
political-legal contexts for social ills not to be overregulated, but to remain unaddressed,
to remain gaps in regulation." Id. at 5.
172. MERMIAN C. FULLER ET AL., UC BERKELEY RENEWABLE AND APPROPRIATE
ENERGY LAB., GUIDE TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCING Dis-
TRIcTs FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 8 (2009), available at http://rael.berkeley.edu/sites/
default/files/old-site-files/2009/FullerKunkelKammen-MunicipalEnergyFinancing209.
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nisms, but must create new ones. At both points in the political process,
there are ample opportunities for opponents to claim that PACE is not
an appropriate use of scarce municipal resources, particularly in tough
economic times. As NIMBY-like opposition to local solar and wind
projects shows, 173 there are plenty of opponents to these projects.
Increasing the number of pressure points where opponents can take on
proponents is not desirable.
PACE is far too complex for the average locality to administer. Its
proponents note correctly that it relies on a bond financing mechanism
with which cities are already likely to be familiar.' 74 However, PACE
special assessment districts are different from traditional improvement
districts. They allow individual owners to opt into the program, rather
than sharing the cost of an improvement among all property owners in
the district.' 7 5 This makes PACE more like a lending program and less
like a one-time decision to assess a tax. A city would be required to make
decisions on an ongoing basis about individual homeowners' suitability
for participation in the program. This is a responsibility that not all cities
will be willing to undertake, and it is therefore no surprise that cities like
Berkeley with active environmental departments have been the first ones
to adopt PACE. 176 Bring PACE to Peoria, and it may be a wholly differ-
ent matter to convince local officials to devote municipal resources to the
solar business. Many localities are fighting for their economic lives, and
schools, libraries and other public facilities will be much higher priorities
than PACE.177
pdf (noting that "setting up and administering an Energy Financing District requires staff
time on the part of local governments"). Not surprisingly, as of early 2010, no localities
in the following states with state PACE laws had developed local financing programs:
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, and Virginia.
173. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 639-41.
174. WHITE HOUSE FRAMEWORK, supra note 157, at 2 ("Land-secured financing
districts (also known as special tax or special assessment districts) are a familiar tool in
municipal finance. In a typical assessment district a local government issues bonds to
fund projects with a public purpose such as streedights, sewer systems or underground
utility lines. Property owners that benefit from the improvement then repay the bond
through property assessments, secured by a property lien and paid as a part of the prop-
erty taxes.").
175. CLAUDIA EYZAGUIRRE & ANNIE CARMICHAEL, VOTE SOLAR INITIATIVE,
MUNICIPAL PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT FINANCING: REMOVING KEY BARRIERS TO RES-
IDENTIAL SOLAR 5-6 (2008), available at www.cleanenergyfortexas.org/downloads/vote-
solar-initiative.pdf.
176. See City of Berkeley, Office of Energy and Sustainable Development, http://
www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/sustainable.
177. See, e.g., Susan Saulny, Financial Crisis Takes a Toll on Already-Squeezed Cities,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, at A16 ("All over the country, parks are being sold, fees for
routine services are going up and city workers are being laid off."). See also E-mail from
Ronald H. Rosenberg, Professor, William and Mary Law School, to author, Jan. 25, 2010
(on file with author).
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Assuming for the moment that cities do take to the PACE idea, one
major hurdle remains. PACE addresses the issue of upfront cost, but not
the transaction costs of installations. Cities with programs in place have
no municipal installers. So while the city provides the funding to the
homeowner, she is still required to handle legal and technical responsibil-
ities.1 78 If cities decided to tackle these obstacles to solar installations,
many would find themselves in uncharted territory. Vetting equipment
vendors and the like could easily exceed their competence level.
Any approach to urban solar will require municipalities' blessings.
But cities should not shoulder primary responsibility for directing the
process of marketing and distributing solar panels. If we had developed
cell phone networks by asking each city to set up special districts for cell
phone financing, it would have required policy innovations that localities
would not have had the expertise to handle. Moreover, the benefits of
standardization and economies of scale would not be available. PACE
will not yield the large-scale installations that would make solar a disrup-
tive technology because each new special assessment district has to be
created according to the dictates of laws that vary from state to state, and
even from locality to locality. The real innovation would be to find a
different institutional structure that avoids piecemeal policies and
addresses the transaction costs for prospective solar consumers.
D. Solar Power Purchase Agreements
A new model for deploying solar is finding more widespread use in
the commercial setting: the solar power purchase agreement (PPA).' 79 A
PPA does not depend on direct financial incentives to end users to
prompt them to purchase and install solar equipment.' Instead, it
removes the upfront cost.
The solar PPA is a contract entered into between an electricity con-
sumer (called the "host") and a company that is typically not the con-
sumer's retail utility (the "developer" or "solar services provider"). 1 The
developer owns a renewable energy facility installed at the host's site."'
178. As an article by the developers of Berkeleys approach puts it, "[i]t is also
important to note that the other barriers to adoption-information, transaction costs,
and principal-agent barriers-still exist even if first cost is addressed." Fuller et al., supra
note 3, at 9.
179. See Rachel Barron, Power-Purchase Agreements to Spike, GREENTECHSOLAR,
Feb. 14, 2008, http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/power-purchase-agree-
ments-to-spike-591 (claiming that PPAs "will drive 75 percent of commercial and indus-
trial solar sales in 2008 and 2009"); Michael Behar, Selling the Sun, ONEARTH, Feb. 27,
2009, http://www.onearth.org/article/selling-the-sun; see generally U.S. Envd. Prot.
Agency, Solar Power Purchase Agreements, http://www.epa.gov/grnpower/buygp/solar
power.htm.
180. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 179.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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Under the PPA, the developer owns the system, and the host pays the
developer for the power produced. 18 3 The host also provides the devel-
oper access to the site to install equipment and perform maintenance,
typically by granting an easement.' 84 A number of large businesses, such
as the retailers Kohl's and Wal-Mart, and a variety of institutions such as
the Denver International Airport, have used PPAs. Whole Foods Market,
the popular grocery chain, installed solar systems at some of its New
Jersey stores in 2004 through PPAs.
18 5
One report has predicted that, "PPAs will be established as the stan-
dard way that American businesses pay for on-site green power."186 It is
not difficult to see why, as the economic incentives are the inverse of
those in a PACE structure. The developer incurs an upfront capital cost
and is repaid by a long-term revenue stream over the term of a PPA
contract that can last for fifteen to twenty years or more.' 8 7 The devel-
oper/facility owner gets the benefit of tax credits and incentives, and
might be able to sell renewable energy certificates (depending on whether
it or the host retains them'8 8 ) to utilities to satisfy obligations under an
RPS. "'8 9 Forecasting whether those combined revenue streams make a
solar installation economically viable becomes the responsibility of a
company that can presumably bring legal and business talent to bear on
the problem.
183. Id.
184. CHANDRA SHAH, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., POWER PURCHASE
AGREEMENTS 12 (2009), available at wwwl.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdfs/afo-ppa-pres.pdf.
185. Kerry A. Dolan, Paying for Panels, FORBES.COM, Aug. 16, 2007, http://www.
forbes.com/2007/08116/financing-solar-energy-tech-07egang-cz-kd-0816solarfinance.
html.
186. JON GUICE & JOHN D.H. KING, GREENTECH MEDIA RESEARCH, SOLAR
POWER SERVICES: How PPAs ARE CHANGING THE PV VALUE CHAIN 4 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.gtmresearch.com/report/solar-power-services-how-ppas-are-changing-
the-pv-value-chain.
187. An interesting and as yet unaddressed question is whether an obligation
under a PPA would run with the land to subsequent purchasers of the host site. Courts
often disapprove of affirmative covenants to pay money to third parties but might view
this obligation differently.
188. In American Ref-Fuel Company, 105 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,004 (2003), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission declared that state law
governs ownership of the credits generated by renewable energy facilities. Courts ruling
on this issue often hold that renewable QF project attributes are conveyed to power
purchasers. See, e.g., In re Ownership of Renewable Energy Certificates, 913 A.2d 825
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007). But see Fershee, supra note 142 (discussing contrary
decisions). Of course, this could also be resolved by contract.
Setting up proper accounting systems for RECs can also be difficult. Joel B. Eisen,
The Environmental Responsibility of the Regionalizing Electric Utility Industry, 15 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 295 (2005).
189. SHAH, supra note 184, at 4 (calling this a "double bonus" and "good alterna-
tive to purchasing RECs").
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The host must assess whether purchasing power from the developer
is financially advantageous, which does not require evaluation of a large
capital investment. In the short term, rates might be slightly higher, but
the PPA can serve as a hedge against long-term increases in electricity
rates.190 Like a fixed-term mortgage, the host locks in a rate that may be
advantageous in the out years. In the typical PPA transaction, the host
has an option to purchase the facility at some point during the length of
the contract. If it believes the benefits of stable rates over a longer term
would be desirable, it can capture them for itself in this fashion. There
are some drawbacks for hosts considering PPAs. The negotiation process
can be complicated.'91 Also, if the renewable energy system will not meet
100% of the host's needs, the host will have to continue service with its
existing provider and pay two separate electricity bills.' 92 As a new
arrangement, the long-term viability of PPAs has yet to be proven.
193
Why not simply extend this model to the residential setting? Some
companies offering PPAs have years of experience in installing solar,' 94
but very few offer a residential PPA. 195 As one observer puts it, "[simall
projects lack the economies of scale that would make the uncertainties
and transactions [sic] costs worth bearing. " 96 Borrego Solar, which
offers PPAs in commercial and nonprofit settings, "won't even touch
projects smaller than 200 kW." 97 A residential solar system typically is
in the 3-10 kW range,i 9 8 so this limitation effectively restricts the PPA
to the commercial setting. The "uncertainties" include the lack of pre-
190. IN OUR BACKYARD, supra note 4, at 13.
191. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 179.
192. Id.
193. If a PPA developer failed, what would happen to "its" equipment located at
the host's site? One can readily imagine a situation such as a bankruptcy proceeding
where a successor in interest would be required to remove the solar panels. That state of
affairs should be avoided.
194. See, e.g., Borrego Solar, http://www.borregosolar.com/solar-energy-company/
solar-contractor.php (last visited June 7, 2010).
195. Musser, supra note 1.
196. Id.
197. Id
198. Calculating the required system size is no small matter. Many factors affect
the size of a system designed to serve the electricity needs of a household, including the
household's electricity demand, hours of sun it receives per day, and so forth. The 3-10
kW range is a synthesis of a number of estimates widely available on the Internet through
multi-step calculators that attempt to empower homeowners to decide how large their
systems should be. See, e.g., Residential Solar Panels, http://www.residentialsolarpanels.
org/plan-solar-system (last visited June 7, 2010). A New Jersey utility puts the average size
of a residential solar system at 7 kW. PSE&G Solar Loan Program, Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs)-Residential, http://www.pseg.com/customer/solar/faq-residential.jsp
#anchor5 (last visited June 7, 2010).
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dictability in the subsidies that a PPA developer would receive.199 Also,
unlike universities and airports, homeowners move every so often, which
might require renegotiation of a PPA deal with a new owner. But there is
no reason why these and other uncertainties could not be addressed.
V. TowARD PROMOTING DISRUPTIVENESS IN URBAN SOLAR
[Slomeone has got to do for solar installation what Apple did for the
cellphone [sic]: make it so simple that even an astrophysicist could do
It.200
If utilities are reluctant to scale up urban solar, and PPA developers
generally eschew small installations, then who will market and distribute
solar to households? There are no obvious candidates. Since the 1970s,
renewables industries have always had an aspect of small scale. Many
factors account for this, including owners' reliance on smaller companies
to help them establish independence from utility companies (including
those hardy souls who live "off the grid"). This has been a business with a
pioneering decentralized ethic.
A. A New Business Model: One Company
Handles the Entire Process
It is time for this business model to change. The present situation
begs for a solar utility to take over the entire process of marketing and
distribution in a wide geographic area, offering a comprehensive, stream-
lined solution to homeowners. There are no such options at present for
residential users, except in the few states where companies offer PPAs or
similar lease-type arrangements,2 or where utilities themselves have
embarked on distributed solar projects. Another intriguing solution is the
Home Depot home improvement chain's service, which offers turnkey
panel installing and "applying for and processing all permits, tax credits
and coordination with your power company."20 2 The entry of a major
home improvement company into this market suggests the time is ripe
for a solar utility to go even further and handle the entire process. In
199. If RECs are one component of the PPA developer's project revenue stream,
any variability in their value could harm project viability. See, e.g., Musser, supra note 1
(noting that PPA developers rely "heavily on tradable certificates of fluctuating value").
200. Id.
201. The SunRun company recently announced that it would enter the solar mar-
ket in New Jersey, bringing its coverage to a total of five states. Nate Lew, SunRun to
Offer Residential Solar Energy Service in New Jersey, COOLERPLANET, Jan. 21, 2010, http:/
/solar.coolerplanet.com/News/19571903-sunrun-to-offer-residential-solar-energy-service-
in-new-jersey.aspx; see also Mark Jaffe, Dimming Solar Costs: Home Systems Are Becoming
More Affordable With Zero-Down Leasing, DENVER PosT, Feb. 4, 2010, at B5 (describing
SunRun's activities in Colorado).
202. Solar Power Installation-The Home Depot, http://www.homedepot.com
(follow "Services: Installation" hyperlink; then follow "Solar Power Systems" hyperlink).
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combination with a PPA-like financial model (which Home Depot does
not offer2 °3), turnkey installations would fundamentally change the
nature of urban solar.
A solar utility would address the legal, financial, technical, and
administrative tasks of solar installations and assuage homeowners' con-
cerns. This company would have the ability and resources to overcome
the "last mile" problem 20 4 and provide a comprehensive package includ-
ing both the hardware and the other services required to support it
(including, for example, maintenance of the panels). Using PPA-like
financing and standardized technology, it could work out the engineering
at host sites, gaining expertise as it engaged in more deals. This would
also relieve homeowners of most of these responsibilities. Solar utilities
might even bundle solar panel installations with other products, such as
automakers might do with plug-in hybrids or a Home Depot might do
with other home improvements.
The federal government should select solar utilities that have the
expertise and resources to scale up to a nationwide basis. Many different
kinds of companies could become solar utilities, and we should therefore
be relatively agnostic about deciding which ones should qualify for gov-
ernment licenses.20 5 There should be no requirement, for example, that
the companies be stand-alone businesses; an existing company's business
unit could take advantage of the company's strengths.2"6 To provide an
incentive for solar utilities, the federal government could offer them
exclusive rights to provide installations in specific geographic territories.
A comparable example would be the proliferation of cable television
through governmental franchises. The structure in each market would be
among the many details to be worked out; for example, it could be a
203. Another shortcoming of this approach is that Home Depot could not step
into a homeowner's shoes to overcome legal opposition (e.g., by doing battle with a
homeowners' association wielding covenants to stop an installation). Rosenberg, supra
note 6.
204. Of course, I use this term deliberately to echo the expansive body of literature
on such familiar "last mile" problems as bringing the power of the Internet to consumers
by bridging the "distance between main data lines and individual homes, businesses, and
schools." James Fallows, E-Mail Out of Every Plug, THE ATLA?.ric, June 2006, available
at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/06/email-out-of-every-plug/4874.
205. Because utility companies have captured state PUCs and dominated the
restructuring process (for example, by arguing successfuly in many states that they were
entitled to recoup billions of dollars in "stranded costs" despite controversy over their
claims to entitlement), state legislatures and regulatory agencies might require solar utili-
ties to compete with incumbent utilities. This does not make sense from a disruptiveness
theory perspective, but may reflect political reality.
206. Danneels, supra note 12, at 256-57 ("When resource complementarities
between the new venture and the mainstream business are crucial, and these complemen-
tarities require intracompany coordination, a more integrated approach may be
advised.").
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duopoly, as was originally done with cell phone companies.2 °7 The struc-
ture could also provide for disaggregation of the industry when specific
performance benchmarks were met.
Any scheme this dramatically different from current practice will
have its critics. One likely objection is that the federal government has a
less-than-perfect track record of picking winners and losers. It often gets
involved well after the technology is developed and can make decisions
that hinder further technology development. 20 8 Contrast that, however,
with the situation that exists at present, where no company has gained
the legal and regulatory expertise, approvals, and technical know-how to
be a full-fledged solar distribution company. A regulated structure may
well be able to do what a fragmented, competitive industry cannot. It can
overcome the regulatory instability and high upfront regulatory costs by
offering one entry point to the regulatory process. Once a company han-
dles the process of securing necessary federal, state, and local approvals to
proceed with installations, it would incur fewer additional transaction
costs. Given the difficulty of doing this at present, it is unlikely that any
company would take on this task without governmental support.
Because creating unchecked monopolists leads to undesirable
monopoly rent, a combination of state and federal regulation of this
industry may be warranted, much as we regulate cable and telecommuni-
cations companies. It is already likely that solar utilities would be subject
to state regulation as public utilities, unless existing state laws were
amended. A number of state public utility commissions have considered
whether PPA developers are public utilities because they sell electricity to
retail customers. The New Mexico Public Regulation Commission ruled
recently that PPA developers are not "public utilities" under that state's
laws because they offer their services to specified individuals and not to
the public.20 9 The state's largest utility2 10 and other rural electric cooper-
207. The regulator overseeing this process would need considerable resources to
evaluate the applicants. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 59 ("Between 1982 and 1986, the FCC
planned to use comparative worth regulatory hearings to assign licenses [in the cell phone
industry]. However, the FCC did not have the engineering resources to evaluate the
many proposals, so the FCC awarded licenses for smaller cities and rural areas using a
passive mechanism: lotteries. The lottery assignment mechanism attracted entrepreneurs
with very little capability to operate a wireless phone carrier.").
208. In the cell phone industry, for example, the FCC's opening of additional
spectrum that made the switch from analog to digital telephony possible trailed the devel-
opment of the technology by years. Id.
209. Marjorie Childress, Renewable Energy Gets a Greenlight from NM Public Regu-
lation Commission, N.M. INDEPENDENT, Dec. 23, 2009, available at http://newmexico
independent.com/43552/renewable-energy-gets-a-greenlight-from-nm-public-regulation-
commission. Other states reaching similar decisions include Nevada, Michigan, Colo-
rado, Oregon, California, New Jersey, Maryland, Connecticut, Hawaii, and Massachu-
setts. Third-Party Arrangements for Renewable Energy Generation, Utah Pub. Svc.
Comm'n, Docket No. 09-999-12 (Comments of Utah Clean Energy, Nov. 16, 2009, at
3), available at http://www.psc.state.ut.us/urilities/misc/miscindxl0999912indx.html.
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atives had argued to the contrary. Their logic would apply more readily
to solar utilities that would serve numerous customers and would almost
certainly be public utilities in every sense of the word.
State monopoly regulation of this industry would also recognize our
electricity system's uniqueness. When restructuring experiments in the
1990s allowed new companies to enter into part of the industry (electric-
ity generation), the results were abysmal. Many states, including my
home state of Virginia, have turned away from deregulation to traditional
cost-of-service regulation or a variant of it.u"' Monopoly protection may
also be required to subsidize the inefficiency of melding widely different
skills of construction, property management (maintenance and repair),
and regulatory analysis and compliance in a single company, or, to put it
another way, to minimize consumers' exposure to the full risk of business
failure.
Perhaps the most significant reason to regulate solar utilities as
monopolies is to ensure their financial viability. They would depend on
three revenue streams: state and federal tax credits and incentives (includ-
ing the production tax credit or investment tax credit, as appropriate);
revenue from the sale of RECs; and revenue from monthly electricity
payments by homeowners. As noted above, the tax credits can be sub-
stantial, defraying as much as 50% of project capital costs. 212 One option
for a company would be to finance the remaining amount with debt that
would be repaid through a combination of the sale of RECs to utilities
and the monthly electricity payments.2 13
An ambitious and detailed study in 2009 by the University of Dela-
ware's Center for Energy and Environmental Policy explored whether
this combination of revenue streams would support a "Solar Energy Util-
ity" for the city of Newark, Delaware.2 14 In this hypothetical scheme, the
city would charter and operate a utility that would install and operate
solar panels on a high percentage of city rooftops. This legal structure has
some of the same drawbacks as PACE, in that it would require a city to
become involved in the utility business when it may lack the expertise or
inclination to do so. However, the financial analysis of the proposed pro-
The Utah Public Service Commission is also dealing with the issue. Id. As of the writing
of this article, it has not yet reached a decision.
210. Public Service Company of New Mexico.
211. See Report of the State Commission Practice and Regulation Committee, 30
ENERGY L.J. 765, 793 (2009) ("[A]fter six years in which only very limited interest was
shown in this Virginia retail market by both end-use customers and competitive suppliers,
in 2007, the General Assembly adopted legislation effectively re-regulating the market
212. CREATING A SOLAR CITY, supra note 2, at 39.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 40.
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ject is worth noting, because it would be the same for a private-sector
solar utility.
The authors contacted two energy investment firms, which con-
cluded that the project would be financially viable under the conditions
proposed.2 15 The study mentions two caveats. First, the number of RECs
in a scaled-up solar market might exceed utility demand for them, driv-
ing the price down. One solution to this might be a national RPS with a
national REC market, as the study assumes that RECs generated in Dela-
ware could only be sold in the thirteen states of the PJM Interconnection
regional market. 216 Second, the demand for federal tax credits could be
substantial and pose a drain on federal resources. The authors call for
federal support of tax incentives at higher levels than present.2 17 In this
Article's solar utility model, the federal government could conceivably
take in revenue by creating and selling territory licenses, as it did with the
cell phone industry, and use that revenue to fund added support for tax
credits.
One assumption undergirding the Delaware study's financial analy-
sis is that electricity prices would remain stable over the long term.2 t8 As
in the commercial PPA setting, the contractual rate lock-in is necessary
for debt financing. In the solar utility context, a state public utility com-
mission could regulate rates to ensure that consumers were protected
from excessive rates, while the utility could earn a reasonable rate of
return. Of course, this idea is not new. Throughout our history, we have
relied upon a "regulatory compact" that grants protection from competi-
tion to companies that serve the public, taking the risk to scale up and
serve end users. In return, they agree to governmental regulation of the
rates they charge (and rate of return) and services they offer. 219 This
protection can dramatically increase the economic desirability of entering
into an industry.
Consumers might view this financial structure more favorably than
that of any other current incentive for solar power. There would be no
upfront cost, and the monthly rate premium for green power would be
substantially less than the added property tax increment of PACE (the
only viable incentive that promises to eliminate the upfront cost). More
research would be necessary to determine consumers' willingness to pay,
but it seems plausible that small monthly premiums at the outset of a
PPA-like contract would not deter consumers.22 ° An analogy would be
215. Id. at 41-42.
216. Id. at 43-44.
217. Id
218. Id. at 42 (using a "Price-to-beat" of $0.14/kWh increasing at 2.5% per year).
219. For a contemporary use of the term in this context, see Kathy Larsen, Buffett
and the Railroads: The 'Social Compact'Applies, POWER LINES, Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.
platts.com/weblog/powerlines/2OlO/O3/O2/buffett-and-the-railroads.html.
220. Sachs, supra note 4, at 309-10.
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the purchase of a cell phone, where carriers subsidize the hardware and
recoup those amounts during the contract period with fees for services.
Those can often amount to more than the hardware cost, but this fact
has not prevented millions of Americans from purchasing cell phones.
Moreover, locking in the rate (as with a PPA) can make solar power less
expensive than fossil fuel-generated power over the long term.
It is not clear what would happen if tax credits were unavailable
because they were not renewed or not sufficiently large enough to sup-
port solar utilities. To be in business for the long haul, solar utilities must
have a long-term guarantee that the funding stream will be less inconsis-
tent than solar tax credits have been over the past three decades. This is
no small matter. The history of this industry is rife with companies that
thought they would succeed but did not. Between 1978 and 1985, when
federal tax credits were in place, major companies (including some For-
tune 500 companies) sold solar technology, but when the tax credits
evaporated, so too did the companies. 2 ' It is also not clear that solar
utilities would own RECs created by residential projects, which is cur-
rently a matter of state law and hardly settled uniformly. These are
among many financial questions that remain to be addressed before solar
utilities can become a reality.
B. A Research Agenda
Not surprisingly, given the comprehensive scope of this solar utility
proposal, there are numerous financial, legal and technical issues to be
worked out. With this in mind, it would perhaps be more appropriate to
call the proposal a platform for a much longer analysis, and to group the
major issues in a typology of sorts. A research agenda might include the
following, with some issues depending on the resolution of others as
noted:
1) Economies of scale. The proposal's eventual success rests on a
notion that while individual installations might have low profit
margins, a solar utility's economies of scale in installing multiple
systems might be potentially lucrative. This in turn depends on
whether there are in fact scale economies in various technical
aspects of the business: for example, can a company create sav-
ings if it services multiple jobs in a small geographic area? Per-
haps the greatest potential area of savings is regulatory. This of
course would depend in turn on the contours of the regulatory
approval process. Further research here should focus on the eco-
nomics of the solar utility's business model bringing legal, tech-
nical, and business aspects of the transaction under one roof.
221. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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2) Company structure Regulatory design on this point must be
careful. If an entrant knows nothing about the solar business, we
will run the same risk of failure as in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Disruptiveness theory also tells us that incumbent electric
utilities have shortcomings, but that should not completely pre-
clude them from entering into the business. While this situation
may not be directly comparable to that of restructuring (new
entrant companies would not be required to share infrastructure
with existing utilities, as was the case then), the possible side-by-
side presence of new entrants and utilities would require careful
consideration to ensure that the utilities do not use incumbent
advantages to dominate the business.
3) Monopoly regulation: As noted above, if the industry is structured
in a monopolistic (or duopolistic) fashion, companies might
extract monopoly rents without regulation. This proposition
requires testing, perhaps with a pilot program under the auspices
of a state public utility commission. This pilot program should
also examine whether consumers will be willing to pay the small
premium in higher prices of electricity generated from solar
power.
4) Technology choice- The consumer experience should be stream-
lined, but technology choice should not be overly constrained.
Different solar designs work best on different homes, depending
on such factors as roof shape, geography and orientation
(whether the roof faces south, for example). Also, the entity
offering the technology should have an economic incentive to
change to new and better technology, at least for new installa-
tions, as that technology becomes available. Careful attention
should be paid to deciding what technologies are to be made
available at the inception of these companies and how best to
promote continued innovation.
5) Municipal approvals: Comprehensive studies would determine
what permits and licenses would be necessary to operate at the
municipal level in each state. While this proposal would proba-
bly require less work on a city's part than establishing a PPA, it
still would entail time and resources that could be spent else-
where. More importantly, then, there should be incentives (per-
haps financial) for cities to participate.
6) State property law: It is not at all clear that a "residential PPA"
agreement would run with the land, and research into the law of
covenants would be necessary. Also, it might take a federal law
to cure the problem of neighborhood covenant resistance, com-
parable in some ways to what was done with opposition to tele-
vision satellite dishes. Because land use policies are traditionally
thought of as a predominantly local concern, any effort in this
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direction would face federalism concerns (comparable to those
faced by the energy efficiency provisions in climate bills). Still, as
consumers currently bear all of the risk of action against them by
their homeowners' associations, it would be more desirable to
explore how a third party could step into the homeowner's shoes
or how the problem could be resolved at the federal level.
7) Legal authority: Analyses of a wide variety of existing and (poten-
tially) proposed legal authorities would be needed. One impor-
tant question is whether it would take amendments to the
Federal Power Act or state public utility statutes (or both) for
solar companies to proceed.
This recital of challenges should not deter us from pursing the goal
of making solar installations high-volume transactions instead of the
equivalent of custom home building. Thirty years' experience with
renewable energy has resulted in little progress. While some existing
incentives (e.g., FITs) are of recent vintage in U.S., they are unlikely to
address the most important issues preventing widespread adoption of res-
idential solar technology.
In this fragmented industry, gains in disruption from adopting a
different type of business model can be much more effective than relying
on an existing one.222 The utility's argument in the New Mexico case has
been made in other states, and suggests that any proposal to create solar
utilities would encounter stiff resistance. Opposition from incumbent
companies should be no bar to adopting a disruptive technology. In
many cases, in fact, it is the strongest signal that a new business model is
warranted.22
3
As Professor Christensen explains, "[d]isruption can take decades if
independent disruptive companies rely on other disruptive companies to
put in place, piece by piece,"224 their parts of a marketing and distribu-
tion network. Because there are a lot of moving parts in this system, we
do not have time to waste while we try out other ideas that only address
part of the problem.
Electricity generated from solar is still more expensive than conven-
tionally generated electricity, but not by so much that it would make
sense to wait to bring it to the masses. The delays in creating this com-
prehensive system of solar utilities outweigh the value of incremental
improvements in technology. Working toward this result is preferable to
following our current course, which would deter the average American
consumer from adopting solar technology for many years to come.
222. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra, note 41, at 26.
223. 141 at xlvi ("Regulators must beware ... of attempts by the leading institu-
tions to outlaw business model innovation. Regulation should facilitate it.").
224. Id at xxx.
